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Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts:
Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the Constitutionality
of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation
NEAL R. PANDOZZI*
There is a growing consensus that if the jumble of state and
federal statutes, consumer pressure, and self-help is to be unified into
meaningful privacy protection in the digital age, then we will have to
do more than pass a law. The law in general, and each of us in partic-
ular, will have to make some fundamental adjustments in the way we
think of personal information and electronic communication. In
doing so, we will ultimately have to change our idea of what we can
reasonably expect to keep private.
Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy'
INTRODUCTION
As financial intermediaries, banks accept deposits from customers
who have money and transform them into loans to customers who need
money. Yet, with each banking transaction, customers unwittingly
deposit another asset, one even more valuable than money. When cus-
tomers deposit money with or obtain loans from their banks, they also
deposit private financial information about themselves. As a result,
banks have tapped into this valuable resource, developing an industry
practice that, until recently, went virtually undiscovered: selling custom-
ers' financial information.2
* Associate with the Public Finance Group, Tillinghast Licht Perkins Smith & Cohen, LLP.
B.A. 1995, Providence College; J.D. 1999, Roger Williams University School of Law; LL.M.
2000, Boston University School of Law. The theories and opinions expressed in this article do not
necessarily reflect those of Tillinghast Licht Perkins Smith & Cohen, LLP, or its attorneys. I wish
to thank Cornelius K. Hurley, Jr. for his insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 332 (1995).
2. See Christine Dugas, Banks Sell Your Secrets: Account Numbers, Names, Addresses Are
All Fair Game, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1999, at IB [hereinafter Dugas, Banks Sell Your Secrets].
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The recent publicity surrounding this practice has raised consumer
consciousness about financial privacy threats and whether consumers
can control how the financial services industry uses personal financial
information.3 Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court has never rec-
ognized a legitimate expectation of privacy in one's financial informa-
tion, specifically the information contained in one's checks and deposit
slips.4 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's interpretation, Congress
reacted to consumers' growing fears that banks were selling their private
financial data by adopting Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act5
(hereinafter "the GLBA") to govern financial institutions' disclosure of
such information.
Title V "contains the most comprehensive federal privacy legisla-
tion in history."6 The GLBA's Title V framework places three general
privacy requirements on a financial institution:
1) a commitment to protect and ensure the privacy of confidential
consumer information; 2) a requirement to advise consumers about its
information-sharing practices and to provide customers an option to
'opt-out' of providing information to third parties; and 3) implementa-
tion of comprehensive standards to ensure the confidentiality of con-
sumer's personal information.7
Thus, for the first time, the GLBA gives consumers an absolute
right to know whether their financial institution plans to sell or share
their personal financial information with either affiliated companies or
3. See Donna Tanoue, Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Is It Any of Your
Business? Consumer Information, Privacy and the Financial Services Industry (Mar. 23, 2000),
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/chairman/sp23Mar00.html.; see also Don Oldenburg,
Consummate Consumer; To-Do over Privacy Legislation, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2000, at C04,
(stating the opinions of some consumer advocates that Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not go far
enough to protect consumers' privacy).
4. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see also ABA Paper Says U.S. Banks
Adequately Protect Consumers' Privacy, 17 No. 14 BANKING POL'Y REP. 5, 6 (1998) (discussing
the case) [hereinafter ABA Paper].
5. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
[hereinafter "GLBA"]. The Act is named after Senators Phil Gramm, head of the Senate Banking
Committee, James Leach, head of the House Banking Committee and Thomas Bliley, chairman of
the House Commerce Committee. The Title V privacy provisions were added relatively late in the
legislative process. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Postscript on Privacy; Bank Bill's Late Change
Gives States Last Word, WASH. PosT, Nov. 5, 199, at El; see also Pamela Barnett, Making
Privacy a Partisan Affair, CONG. DAILY, May 5, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21160116 (stating
that the financial services industry was largely caught off guard by the level of ferocity that
legislators exhibited in taking hold of the issue).
6. L. Richard Fischer & Clarke Dryden Camper, Reform Law and Privacy: A Road Map,
Am. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1999, at 6. See generally Lucy Griffin, The New Privacy Rules, INDEP.
BANKER, Mar. 1, 2000, at 2836, available at 2000 WL 10729709 (discussing Title V's privacy
standards).
7. Richard M. Whiting, Promises Finally Kept: Glass-Steagall Repealed ... and More, J.
LENDING & CREDIT RISK MOMT., Feb. 1, 2000, at 48, available at 2000 WL 17178301.
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nonaffiliated third parties.8 Additionally, consumers can opt-out of such
information sharing between financial institutions and nonaffiliated third
parties.9 However, Title V is merely the tip of the GLBA's iceberg.' 0
Prior to the enactment of the GLBA, commercial banks were con-
fined within an antiquated, Depression-era legal framework. Banks
were unable, at least directly, to affiliate with securities firms and insur-
ance companies. Over the years however, market forces within the
financial services industry and the attorneys who follow them have
uncovered clever ways to bypass these legal roadblocks." Nevertheless,
when President Clinton signed the GLBA into law on November 12,
1999, the GLBA, also known as the Financial Services Modernization
Act, eliminated many of the affiliation barriers between banks and
securities and investment firms,' 2  thereby enabling banks, securities
firms and insurance companies to consolidate within a holding company
8. See GLBA § 502; Admin. of William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing Legislation To
Reform Financial System, 35 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRES. DoCs. 2363, 2364 (Nov. 12, 1999);
Financial Modernization Crosses the Finish Line, CBA REP., Nov. 1, 1999, at 1, available at 1999
WL 20345608.
9. See GLBA § 502.
10. Speaking of icebergs, Ed Mierzwinski, consumer advocate with the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group, referred to the federal agencies' proposed privacy regulations, required under
GLBA Title V, as "rearranging deckchairs on the Titanic." See Amber Veverka, New Banking
Rules Keep Customer Information-Sharing in Check, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS:
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 12902829.
11. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - Financial Services
Modernization Working Summary No. 4, at i-iii (1999) [hereinafter Gibson, Dunn, Working
Summary]. Since 1983, the financial services industry has seen several legal developments: (1)
securities and insurance companies acquired "nonbank banks"; (2) regulators authorized South
Dakota and Delaware banks to engage in insurance underwriting; (3) Section 20 bank affiliates
could engage in investment banking; (4) national bank branches located in towns with populations
equaling 5000 could sell insurance; (5) Mellon Bank acquired the Dreyfus mutual fund complex;
(6) with the Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995), and Barnett Bank
of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), decisions, the Supreme Court validated national
bank insurance activities; (7) by acquiring thrifts, over fifty insurance and securities firms became
"unitary" S&L holding companies; and (8) Travelers/Salomon Smith Barney and Citicorp merged
to form Citigroup. Id.; see also Whiting, supra note 7 (providing myriad examples of how the
banking industry sidestepped the Glass-Steagall Act). See generally Christine Dugas, Congress
OK's Bill Deregulating Financial Services Industry, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 1999, at 12B
(providing a general summary of U.S. financial modernization up to GLBA) [hereinafter Dugas,
Congress OK's Bill]; Daniel Kadlec, Bank on Change in Repealing the Glass-Steagall Act,
Congress Is Giving Its Blessing to What Bankers Have Already Done. Expect Fewer Banks.
Hope for Better Ones, TIME, Nov. 8, 1999, at 50; Aaron Zitner, Consumer Bank-Bill Impact Seen
Minimal: Suits, Other Challenges Have Already Brought Changes: Bank Bill Impact Seen
Minimal for Consumers, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 1999, at A 1l.
12. GLBA repeals sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 12
U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1994), that restricted member bank and securities firm affiliations. See GLBA
§ 101. For a brief history of banking reform from Glass-Steagall to the GLBA, see KENNETH R.
BENSON ET AL., FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION: GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999:
LAW AND EXPLANATION 25-30 (1999).
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structure called a financial holding company.' 3
Theoretically, financial holding companies can provide consumers
with virtually any kind of financial product or service at lower costs.' 4
For example, a financial holding company can offer services such as
banking, securities underwriting, insurance (both agency and underwrit-
ing) and merchant banking, as well as other services that the Federal
Reserve Board (hereinafter "FRB") and the Department of the Treasury
determine are "financial in nature" or "complementary to financial activ-
ities.""5 Therefore, these financial supermarkets will offer the consumer
one-stop financial shopping.' 6  For all of its benefits, however, the
GLBA raises a host of burdens. These resulting financial conglomerates
will have access to huge databases filled with customers' personal infor-
mation.' 7 As a result, the GLBA's Title V privacy provisions raise sev-
eral concerns, including one of constitutional proportion.
First, several congressmen and consumer groups believe that Title
V does not go far enough to protect financial information.' 8 Under Title
V, each financial services company must provide its customers with
notice of its privacy policy and an opportunity to opt out of information
sharing with nonaffiliated third parties. Nevertheless, financial services
companies remain free to share a customer's financial information with
their affiliates. Additionally, the opt-out mechanism is subject to certain
exceptions that may create an information-sharing loophole for financial
services companies.
13. See EDWARD D. HERLIHY ET AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
1999: CONVERGING TOWARDS THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 67 (1999).
14. See id.; Admin. of William J. Clinton, supra note 8; see also Mark Selinger, Christian
Bruce & Mark Felsenthal, Financial Services Reform: Conferees Tentatively Approve Landmark
Financial Services Measure, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 25, 1999, at d2 (quoting President
Clinton as saying that the GLBA "will bring lower costs, more choices, and better protections for
consumers" and promote "continued investment in America's communities and new opportunities
to for our financial institutions to compete in the global marketplace").
15. See HERLIHY, supra note 13.
16. See Mike McNamee et al., Invasion of the Superbanks? Congress May Finally Be Ready
to Allow a Financial Free-for-All, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 1, 1999 (stating that, "for consumers, these
superbanks will offer one-stop financial shopping, selling checking accounts, mutual funds, and
car, home, or life insurance in the same branches"); Michael Schroeder, Glass-Steagall
Compromise Is Reached, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at A2.
17. See Dugas, Banks Sell Your Secrets, supra note 2.
18. See, e.g., Dean Anason, Minn., N.Y Vow to Keep Prosecuting Privacy Cases, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 24, 2000, at 1; Dugas, Congress OK's Bill, supra note 11; Rob Garver, In Brief:
Lawmakers Slam Proposed Privacy Rules, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5, 2000, at 4; Brian Krebs,
Advocates, Banks Spar over Proposed Privacy Regs, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Apr. 3, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 2275580; Stephen Labaton, Republicans Propose a Deal on Financial
Services, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1999, at C 1; Schroeder, supra note 16. But see Privacy Hearing
Focuses on Affiliate Sharing, CBA REP., Aug. 1, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 20345598
(discussing comments by privacy expert Richard Fischer that information-sharing barriers could
damage consumers and the economy).
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Second, Title V requires that the following federal agencies pro-
mulgate privacy rules: the FRB, the Department of the Treasury (cover-
ing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereinafter "OCC")
and the Office of Thrift Supervision (hereinafter "OTS")),'9 the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter "FDIC"), the National Credit
Union Association (hereinafter "NCUA"), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (hereinafter "SEC") and the Federal Trade Commission
(hereinafter "FTC").2" To avoid inconsistency and confusion, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (hereinafter "NAIC")
has encouraged state insurance regulators to enact a uniform system of
privacy regulations. 21 As a result the SEC, FTC and NCUA have each
issued separate final privacy rules, and the FRB, FDIC and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury have issued joint final rules that govern the bank-
ing industry.22 However, even with these attempts to limit the number
19. The OCC and the OTS are both members of the Department of the Treasury. See
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 67 (1997). The
OTS is a subsidiary within the Department of the Treasury and not an independent agency. The
legal status of the OCC, however, is more ambiguous. Id. Since the OCC is housed within the
Department of the Treasury, the OCC seems to occupy a subordinate position within the chain of
command leading to the President. See id. However, the President appoints the Comptroller for a
five-year term and the Comptroller may only be removed for cause. See id. Thus, the OCC does
have some independence from executive oversight. See id.
20. The OCC regulates national banks, federal branches and federal agencies of foreign banks
and any subsidiaries of such entities. Similarly, the FRB regulates its member banks, branches
and agencies of foreign banks, foreign bank-owned or bank-controlled commercial lending
companies, organizations that operate under section 25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act and
bank holding companies, including their non-bank subsidiaries and affiliates. The FDIC however
regulates insured banks (other than members of the FRB) and insured state branches of foreign
banks, including their subsidiaries. The OTS regulates savings associations with FDIC-insured
deposits, including their subsidiaries. The NCUA regulates federally insured credit unions and
their subsidiaries. The SEC regulates any brokers and dealers, investment companies and
registered investment advisors. Subject to section 104 of GLBA, state insurance authorities, under
state insurance law, regulate any person engaged in providing insurance. Finally, under GLBA,
the FTC regulates any other financial institution or other person not subject to the aforementioned
agencies or authorities. See GLBA § 505(a). More specifically, under the GLBA, the FTC's
regulatory authority extends to "mortgage lenders, 'pay-day' lenders, finance companies,
mortgage brokers, account services, check cashers, wire transferors, travel agencies operated in
connection with financial services, debt collectors, credit counselors and other financial advisors,
and tax preparation firms." FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33678 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. pt. 313).
21. See Deborah Lohse, Approval Path for Insurers May Shorten, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14,
2000, at A3; Rodd Zolkos, Industry Wary of States' Privacy Moves, Bus. INs., Mar. 6, 2000, at
18H, available at 2000 WL 8170566 [hereinafter Zolkos, Industry Wary]. NAIC, a non-profit
corporation, is an organization of insurance regulators representing the fifty states, District of
Columbia and the four U.S. territories, and providing a forum for developing uniform insurance
policies.
22. See, e.g., Eileen Canning & Marc Selinger, Financial Services: New Powers for Financial
Holding Companies Present 'Two-Edged Sword,' Fed Official Says, BNA BANKING DAILY, Jan.
21, 2000, at d3 (discussing FCRA loophole restricting states' ability to enact tougher privacy laws
under the GLBA); Edward Staples, Finance Industry Opts for 'Opt-Out' on Cross-Marketing,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of privacy rules, the potential for fifty-one different state rules governing
financial privacy may lead to significant confusion and compatibility
problems.23
Third, in Title V of the GLBA, Congress expressly stated that its
privacy rules were merely a floor, not a ceiling. Accordingly states have
the right to adopt tougher privacy laws governing the financial services
industry without fear of federal preemption.24 However section 104 of
the GLBA and the Fair Credit Reporting Act 25 (hereinafter "FCRA"),
have significantly restrained the states' power to do so
6.2
Fourth, President Clinton raised a constitutional concern regarding
the relationship between Title III and Title V of the GLBA when he
signed the bill into law. President Clinton stated that "[t]he Act raises
certain constitutional issues with respect to the insurance privacy provi-
sions in Title V. The Act might be construed as contrary to Supreme
Court decisions that hold that the Congress may not compel states to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program. ' 27  These concerns
raise deeper questions involving the concepts of federalism and federal
preemption of state law that have absorbed the state and federal govern-
ments since the country's founding. 8
Title III, section 305 of the GLBA amends the Federal Deposit
ADVISOR TODAY, Mar. 1, 2000, at 32, available at 2000 WL 15516361 (discussing the federal
agencies' generally uniform proposed privacy regulations).
23. See, e.g., Rodd Zolkos, Insurers Seek Uniform Privacy Guidelines: Trade Groups Voice
Concern over Varied State Rulemaking Efforts, Bus. INS., Mar. 20, 2000, at 20F, available at
2000 WL 8170652 [hereinafter Zolkos, Insurers Seek Privacy Guidelines].
24. See GLBA § 507; see, e.g., Anason, supra note 18; But see Michelle Heller, No Privacy
Laws Seen in N.Y. State This Year, AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 2; Theresa Miller, Vermont
Proposes Strict Privacy Provisions, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Mar. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL
4085325; Megan Ptacek, N.Y Lawmakers Weigh Tougher Privacy Strictures, AM. BANKER, Mar.
22, 2000, at 1; Veverka, supra note 10; Zolkos, Industry Wary, supra note 21; but see also
Theresa Miller, Levin: Legislators Should Let Regulators Form Privacy Rules, BEST'S INS. NEWS,
Mar. 27, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4085417 (discussing trade groups' attempts at encouraging
States to adopt uniform regulations conforming to the Federal rules); Michael Schroeder, Business
Target State Privacy Initiatives: Groups Form to Stop States on Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2000, at A2 (discussing attempts by industry groups to halt State adoption of tougher privacy
laws).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
26. See GLBA § 104; 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994); see, e.g., Richard Fischer & Clarke
Dryden Camper, Fair Credit Law Remains Potent, AM. BANKER, Dec. 17, 1999, at 10; Michelle
Heller, Conflicting Federal Laws Fuel Showdown over States' Rights to Legislate Privacy, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 17, 2000, at 1; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Postscript on Privacy; Bank Bill's Late
Change Gives States Last Word, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at El.
27. Admin. of William J. Clinton, supra note 8.
28. The doctrine of preemption holds that federal laws dealing with certain matters of such
national, as opposed to local, character preempt or take precedence over state laws. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, states may not enact laws inconsistent with such federal
laws. See id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 479-508 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing federal preemption of state laws). Federalism denotes the relationship between
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Insurance Act2 9 (hereinafter "FDIA") by adding section 47.30 Pursuant
to section 47, federal banking agencies (FRB, OCC, OTS and FDIC)
must prescribe insurance customer protection regulations that apply to a
depository institution's insurance sales, solicitations, advertising and
offers.3 1 Under section 47(g)(2)(B)(iii) of the FDIA, the federal banking
agencies' insurance customer protection regulations will preempt
weaker state regulations.32 However, states may adopt legislation to
override the federal preemption, no later than three years after receiving
notice of preemption.33 Yet, under section 505(c) of the GLBA, if state
insurance regulators fail to adopt regulations in accordance with the
Title V privacy provisions, the states can lose their right to reverse the
federal preemption.34
In the conference report accompanying the GLBA, Congress stated
that "[i]t is the hope of the Conferees that state insurance authorities
would implement regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of this
title and enforce such regulations as provided in this title."35 Thus,
although the state insurance authorities are not technically required to
adopt the GLBA's privacy provisions, failing to do so would force the
states to accept the federal banking agencies' insurance customer protec-
tion regulations under the aforementioned amendment to the FDIA.
Therefore, the issue is whether congress has unconstitutionally com-
pelled the states to administer a federal regulatory program by condition-
ing the reverse override right under FDIA section 47 upon the adoption
of the GLBA's Title V privacy provisions. However, a comparison of
section 505(c) of the GLBA with the Supreme Court decisions in New
York v. United States,36 Printz v. United States,37 and Reno v. Condon,38
indicates that the section is not unconstitutional. President Clinton cor-
rectly interpreted the section as providing states with a constitutionally
acceptable choice regarding whether or not to participate in the GLBA's
rulemaking and enforcement obligations.
Since the founding of the United States, state and federal govern-
ments have clashed over the concepts of federalism and preemption; the
the state and federal governments. See BLACK'S, supra, at 612; see also TRIBE, supra, at 378-400
(discussing the concept of federalism).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994).





35. H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 265 (1999).
36. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
37. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
38. 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000).
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GLBA provides a fertile battleground to continue this war. (A compre-
hensive discourse on the GLBA is beyond the scope of this Article.)
Part I provides a general overview of the GLBA, outlining how it will
affect the worlds of banking, securities and insurance by dismantling
and/or amending the barriers erected by the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act. Part II examines federal preemption of
state law under section 104 of the GLBA by untangling and explaining
the section's numerous tests for preemption. Significantly, Part II
exposes the extensive degree of the GLBA's federal preemption in the
financial services field. Part III discusses how section 305 of the GLBA
affects the states as functional regulators of the insurance industry. It
also addresses how the GLBA, through section 104's implied applica-
tion to section 304, will affect states' rights. While pointing out appar-
ent loopholes and weaknesses along the way, Part IV summarizes the
GLBA Title V privacy provisions; the final privacy rules issued by the
FRB, OCC, OTS and FDIC, SEC, FTC and NCUA; and NAIC's state-
level privacy initiatives within the insurance industry. Part IV also
briefly discusses pending state privacy legislation. Part IV focuses on
section 505(c) of the GLBA, and outlines the state insurance authority's
role in enacting the GLBA privacy provisions and how failing to do so
will affect the states' override authority under section 47 of the FDIA.
Finally, Part V compares section 505(c) with the aforementioned
Supreme Court decisions under a Tenth Amendment/federalism analy-
sis. Accordingly, this Part concludes that section 505(c) would pass
constitutional scrutiny.
I. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT: SYNOPSIS OF THE
MAJOR CHANGES
The circumstances leading up to the GLBA have their origin in the
foremost financial crisis of the twentieth century: the Great Depression.
The stock market crash of 1929 led to widespread bank failures and
ultimately The Great Depression. Attempting to remedy the perceived
cause of this economic depression, i.e., bank speculation in securities,3 9
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933.40 Under sections 20
and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, national banks and state banks that
were members of the Federal Reserve System could not affiliate with
companies that could underwrite, sell or distribute specified securities.4 '
39. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 19.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
41. § 335; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 19, at 497. Additionally, under section 21,
investment banks (i.e., securities firms) could not engage in the business of receiving deposits
(deposit or commercial banking). § 378; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 19, at 497.
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Additionally, in 1956, Congress passed the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act.42 Under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, a bank
could not control a non-bank company unless the FRB determined that
the non-bank company's activities were "so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."43 In
1982, Congress amended section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act,
forbidding banks (with limited exceptions) to conduct general insurance
underwriting or agency activities.44
Thus, by enacting the Glass Steagall and Bank Holding Company
Acts, Congress effectively separated the commercial banking, securities
and insurance industries. In 1999, however, Congress changed its mind;
the GLBA repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act which
restricted bank and securities firm affiliations.45
A. Financial Holding Companies
Amending section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act,46 Title I of
the GLBA created a financial holding company.4" A financial holding
company owns a commercial bank and conducts financial activities,48
thus allowing a bank to engage in activities, including insurance and
securities underwriting, that the FRB determines are "financial in
nature" or "incidental to such financial activity."49 Within this financial
holding company structure, banks have gained the freedom to engage in
a wider array of financial services. This freedom is tempered, however,
by the FRB's regulatory oversight.
B. FRB as Umbrella Regulator
In addition to its role as functional regulator of bank holding com-
panies, the FRB acts as the "umbrella" regulator of the new financial
holding companies.5 The FRB, in conjunction with the Secretary of the
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1994).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994); see Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11.
44. § 1843(c)(8).
45. GLBA § 101. See generally BENSON ET AL., supra note 12 (providing a good explanation
of the GLBA); Robert Kuttner, A Requiem for Glass-Steagall, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 15, 1999 (stating
that Congress unnecessarily and, perhaps for the wrong reasons, repealed the Glass-Steagall Act).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1956).
47. See GLBA § 103.
48. See id.; Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 24.
49. GLBA § 103 (amending section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843 [hereinafter "BHCA"]).
50. § 113; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 246, 252-54 (1999) (striking a balance between
the FRB's role as "umbrella supervisor" for holding companies and the other federal and state
financial authorities' roles as functional regulators); Alan Greenspan, Remarks as Prepared for
Delivery at an American Council on Life Insurance Conference (Nov. 15, 1999), FED. Doc.
CLEARING HOUSE TRANSCRIPTS (1999) (discussing the FRB's role under the GLBA).
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Treasury, is authorized to determine whether an activity is "financial in
nature" or "incidental to such financial activity."'5' A financial holding
company does not need prior FRB approval before engaging in financial
activities, either de novo or through an acquisition, previously deemed
permissible by the FRB. 52  However, the financial holding company
51. GLBA § 103 (amending Section 4 of the BHCA). Section 103(a)(3) states:
(3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED
Second, Title V requires that the following federal agencies promulgate privacy
rules: the Federal Reserve Board (hereinafter "FBR"), the Department of the
Treasury (covering the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereinafter
"OCC") and the Office of Thrift Supervision (hereinafter "OTS")),the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter "FDIC"), the National Credit Union
Association (hereinafter "NCUA"), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter "SEC") and the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter "FTC"). To
avoid inconsistency and confusion, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (hereinafter "NAIC") has encouraged state insurance regulators to
enact a uniform system of privacy regulations. As a result the SEC, FTC and
NCUA have each issued separate final privacy rules, and the FRB, FDIC and the
Department of the Treasury have issued joint final rules that governing the banking
industry. However, even with these attempts to limit the number, of privacy rules,
the potential for fifty-one different state rules governing financial privacy may lead
to significant confusion and compatibility problems.
In determining whether an activity is financial in nature or incidental to a financial
activity, the Board shall take into account -
(A) the purposes of this Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act;
(B) changes or reasonably expected changes in the marketplace in which financial
holding companies compete; (C) changes or reasonably expected changes in the
technology for delivering financial services; and
(D) whether such activity is necessary or appropriate to allow a financial holding
company and the affiliates of a financial holding company to -
(i) compete effectively with any company seeking to provide financial services in
the United States;
(ii) efficiently deliver information and services that are financial in nature through
the use of technological means, including any application necessary to protect the
security or efficacy of systems for the transmission of data or financial transactions;
and
(iii) offer customers any available or emerging technological means for using
financial services or for the document imaging of data.
Id.
52. See § 103(a) (adding section 4(k)(a)(6)(A) & (B)); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at
249; HERLHY, supra note 13, at 67 (summarizing the GLBA).
Section 103(a) amends the BHCA to add section 4(k) (a) (4) which states:
(4) ACTIVITIES THAT ARE FINANCIAL IN NATURE:- For purposes of this
subsection, the following activities shall be considered to be financial in nature:
(A) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding money
or securities.
(B) Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness,
disability, or death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal,
agent, or broker for purposes of the foregoing, in any State.
(C) Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory services, including
advising an investment company (as defined in section 3 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940).
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must notify the FRB within thirty days after it has commenced the new
activity or completed the acquisition. 3
Financial holding companies may also engage in activities that the
FRB determines are "complementary to financial activities" if such
activities do not pose substantial safety and soundness risks to deposi-
tory institutions or the financial system generally. 54  Thus, a financial
holding company's freedom to engage in "complementary" activities is
greatly chilled by the FRB's expansive consideration of the activities'
safety and soundness impact not just on depository institutions, but also
on the entire financial system. Additionally, although financial holding
companies may engage in activities that are "financial in nature" or
"incidental to such financial activity" without prior FRB approval, the
FRB must approve "complementary" activities on a case-by-case
basis. 5 Financial holding companies therefore must notify the FRB
before engaging in activities that are complementary to financial
(D) Issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets
permissible for a bank to hold directly.
(E) Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities.
(F) Engaging in any activities that the Board has determined, by order or regulation
that is in effect on the date of the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act, to be
so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto (subject to the same terms and conditions contained in such order or
regulation, unless modified by the Board).
(G) Engaging, in the United States, in activities that-
(i) a bank holding company may engage in outside the United States: and
(ii) the Board has determined, under regulations prescribed or interpretations issued
pursuant to subsection (c)(13) (as in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) to be usual in connection with the
transaction of banking or other financial operations abroad.
(H) Directly or indirectly acquiring or controlling, whether as principal, on behalf of
I or more entities (including entities, other than a depository institution or
subsidiary of a depository institution, that the bank holding company controls), or
otherwise, shares, assets, or ownership interests (including debt or equity securities,
partnership interests, trust certificates, or other instruments representing ownership)
of a company or other entity, whether or not constituting control of such company
or entity, engaged in any activity not authorized by pursuant to this section ....
See GLBA § 103. As aforementioned, the FRB, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, may add to this list. See id. H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 248 (stating that "the Board has
primary jurisdiction for determining what activities are financial in nature, incidental to financial
in nature, or complementary"); see also Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 15
(stating that "the GLB Act gives the Fed authority, by regulation or order, to expand the list of
"financial" or "incidental" activities, but requires consultation with the Treasury").
53. See GLBA § 103(a).
54. § 103; see also H.R. RP. No. 106-434, at 249 (1999) (stating that FHCs may engage "in
activities that are complementary to financial activities if the Federal Reserve Board determine
that the activity does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institution
or the financial system in general") (emphasis added).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 250 (1999) (stating that "FHC's may engage in activities
on the preapproved list of financial activities contained in section 4(k) of the BHCA and any other
financial activity approved by the Board without prior notice. Complementary activities,
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activities .56
C. Functional Regulation
For insurance companies, broker-dealers, investment companies
and banks, the first level of supervisory authority remains with the func-
tional regulators.5 7 For insurance and securities subsidiaries/affiliates,
the functional regulators would be state insurance authorities and the
SEC. 58  Thus, the GLBA adopts an approach whereby the FRB must
defer to these functional regulators regarding interpretations and
enforcement activities within their respective industries. 59 Although in
theory state and federal agencies retain their functional regulation over
operating entities, in practice the FRB retains influential power over the
operations of such downstream companies through its regulation of
however, must be approved by the Board on a case-by-case basis under the notice procedures
contained in section 4(j) of the BHCA").
56. See id.
57. See GLBA § 11; Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary supra note 11, at 24 (defining
"functional regulation" as "the general retention by the state and federal regulators of their present
exclusive jurisdiction and authority over operating entities"). The OCC is confident that GLBA
has strengthened its role as primary supervisor of national banks. See Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Financial Modernization Law Strengthens Role of Primary Bank Regulators,
Comptroller Hawke Says in Speech to New York State Bankers, NEws RELEASE, Apr. 6, 2000, at
1, available at 2000 WL 372526 (O.C.C.) (quoting Hawke as saying, "I believe the new law
simply extends the existing multi-agency concept of financial supervision that we've been refining
for nearly a century.").
58. See GLBA § 112.
59. § 11; see also Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, Financial Services Act of
1999, (on file with author) available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov (summarizing the GLBA);
H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 246 (1999) (discussing how the idea behind functional regulation is to
"incorporate a system ...designed to utilize the strengths of the various Federal and State
financial supervisors"); H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 252 (1999) (stating that:
[d]ifferent regulators have expertise at supervising different activities. It is
inefficient and impractical to expect a regulator to have to develop expertise in
regulating all aspects of financial services. Accordingly, the legislation intends to
ensure that banking activities are regulated by banking regulators, securities
activities are regulated by securities regulators, and insurance activities are
regulated by insurance regulators.);
HERLIHY, supra note 13, at 67-68 (discussing the GLBA's major provisions as they relate to
acquisitions of non-bank financial institutions). See generally Joseph Smith Jr., It Looks Like
Plain English Will Take a While Longer, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 2000 (paraphrasing Comptroller
of the Currency John Hawke Jr. as saying that the GLBA did not cede any power to the FRB, and
that "[U]mbrella supervisor' is a new description for what the Fed has been doing for the last 25
years"). See generally Veronica Agosta, N.Y. Fed Chief and Comptroller Brief Bank Group on
New Law, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 2000 (paraphrasing Federal Reserve Bank of New York Presi-
dent William McDonough as saying that "the Fed must rely 'to the fullest extent possible' on
publicly available information and data submitted to other regulators . . . [W]e at the Federal
Reserve take this aspect of our revised role - sometimes referred to as 'Fed lite' - very seri-
ously"); See generally Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Executive Overview and Summary of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Nov. 15, 1999, at 8-11 (discussing the Federal regulators' roles under
GLBA) [hereinafter Gibson, Dunn, Executive Overview].
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financial holding companies.6 °
For example, emphasizing traditional safety and soundness con-
cerns, if any of a company's insured depository institution subsidiaries
are not well-capitalized or well-managed, the FRB will not allow the
company to form a financial holding company. 61 Additionally, if at the
time of certification any bank affiliate receives a less than satisfactory
Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") rating at its most recent exami-
nation, the FRB will prohibit banks from forming a financial holding
company.62 Furthermore, if a financial holding company either loses its
well-capitalized/well-managed status or receives a less than satisfactory
CRA rating, the FRB may order the financial holding company to either
divest control of any subsidiary depository institutions or revert to a
bank holding company structure.6 3
D. Financial Subsidiaries
The financial holding company structure does not represent a
bank's only hope for engaging in certain financial activities, the GLBA
allows financial subsidiaries of national banks to engage in the same
activities permissible for a financial holding company's non-bank sub-
sidiaries.64 Yet, such allowance is not without its limits.
Although the permissible activities include securities underwriting,
the GLBA does not allow financial subsidiaries to engage in insurance
underwriting, real estate investment or real estate development.65
60. See Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 24 (stating that [Tihe GLB Act
contains numerous trigger points related to legal noncompliance and other serious problems
affecting bank affiliates that could lead to direct Fed involvement and to the possible exercise of
remedial authority affecting both FHCs and their affiliated operating companies. In addition, the
Fed will have an informal ability to affect downstream companies because of its power over the
FHC parent and the tendency of other regulatory agencies to respect and accommodate Fed
positions. But see GLBA § 111; H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 253 (1999) (Consistent with
functional regulation, the Board's authority to take indirect action against a functionally regulated
affiliate is limited. The Board may not promulgate rules, adopt restrictions, safeguards or any
other requirement affecting a functionally regulated affiliate unless the action is necessary to
address a 'material risk' to the safety and soundness of the depository institution or the domestic
or international payments system and it is not possible to guard against such material risk through
requirements imposed directly upon the depository institution).
61. § 103; see also S. 900 Conference Report, Statement of Managers, available at http://
business.cch.com/banking//news/confrept.htm (summarizing the major provisions of the GLBA).
62. § 103.
63. Id. See HERLIHY, supra note 13, at 69 (noting that "while most major bank holding
companies qualify today as both well capitalized and well managed, the standards have proven
difficult to meet during periods of industry downturns"). For a general overview of financial
holding companies' regulatory structure under the GLBA, see Lisa I. Fried, Financial-Industry
Lawyers See Mixed Blessing, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 2000, at 5.
64. See GLBA § 121; H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 254 (1999) (discussing allowable activities
for a bank's "financial" subsidiaries); see also HERLIHY, supra note 13, at 71.
65. See FTC Premerger Notification: Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 65 Fed.
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Regardless of this restriction, all banks and their subsidiaries can sell
insurance through state-licensed bank employees.66 Financial subsidiar-
ies may also engage in merchant banking after a five-year waiting
period, as long as the FRB and the Secretary of the Treasury jointly
permit the activity.67 Additionally, a state bank's financial subsidiaries
may engage in activities permissible only for a national bank's financial
subsidiaries if the state bank meets certain requirements applicable to a
national bank.
68
One cannot overstate the effect that the GLBA is having on the
financial services industry. The FRB has already approved the applica-
tions of 117 bank holding companies that have elected to become finan-
cial holding companies. 69  By dismantling the Glass-Steagall Act and
amending the BHCA, the GLBA gives the financial services industry
precedent-setting structural freedom. Through its extensive preemption
provisions, however, the GLBA takes just as much freedom away from
the states.
Reg. 17880 (2000). In this action, the FTC produced Formal Interpretation 17, which interpreted
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a), (c)(7)-(c)(8) (1994), reporting requirements for
acquisitions involving banking and non-banking businesses. See id. See also HERLIHrY, supra
note 13, at 71. Additionally, the GLBA attaches other restrictions to operating subsidiary
activities. The following list presents examples of these restrictions: (1) bank/operating subsidiary
transactions are subject to all restrictions applicable to bank/non-bank holding company subsidiary
transactions, including Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1994), section 23A
requirements; (2) if the bank is a national bank that is one of the fifty largest U.S. banks, then it
shall have an issue of unsecured long-term debt rated by an independent rating agency in one of
the three highest rating categories; (3) a cap (at the lesser of $50 billion or 45% of the parent
bank's consolidated assets) on all of the assets from the national bank's operating subsidiaries;
and (4) when calculating whether it has complied with regulatory capital standards, the parent
bank shall deduct not only its operating subsidiaries' assets and liabilities, but also its equity
investments in the operating subsidiaries. See id. at 71-72. Also, national banks seeking financial
subsidiaries must meet "well-capitalized"/"well-managed" and CRA tests paralleling those for
financial holding companies. See Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 60.
66. See GLBA §§ 104, 302-03; see also FTC Premerger Notification: Reporting and Waiting
Period Requirements, 65 C.F.R. 17880 (2000) (discussing financial subsidiaries' allowable
activities); Chuck Conlon, Financial Services Agreement No. 106-18, CONG. Q. HousE ACTION
REP. at 4, 6 (1999) (summarizing GLBA); Financial Services Modernization Act, Summary of
Provisions (last modified Oct. 30, 1999) available at http://www.senate.gov/-banking/corf/
grmleach.htm (summarizing GLBA).
67. See GLBA § 104.
68. See § 121; see also FTC Premerger Notification: Reporting and Waiting Period
Requirements, 65 C.F.R. 17880 (2000) (discussing financial subsidiaries' allowable activities);
Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 62 (summarizing the requirements).
69. See Federal Reserve Board Press Release: Bank Holding Companies and *Foreign Bank
Organizations Which Have Effectively Elected To Become or Be Treated as Financial Holding
Companies as of March 11, 2000, (March 13, 2000) available at http://www.Federalreserve.gov/
BoardDocs/Press/BoardActs/2000/20000313/default.htm.
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II. SECTION 104 AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The general role of section 104 is to preempt state laws that inter-
fere with depository institutions' rights under the GLBA. To further this
goal, section 104(d)(1) declares that "no state may... prevent or restrict
a depository institution or an affiliate thereof from engaging directly or
indirectly, either by itself or in conjunction with an affiliate, or any other
person, in any activity authorized or permitted under [the GLBA] and
the amendments made by [the GLBA]."70 It must be noted, however,
that the GLBA's reach goes far beyond the GLBA itself.
A. Section 104 and Blanket Preemption
Under section 104(c)(1), states may not prevent or restrict deposi-
tory institutions or their affiliates from affiliating directly or indirectly or
associating "with any person, as authorized or permitted by this Act or
any other provision of federal law."'71 Thus, under sections 104(c)(1),
(d)(1) and (d)(2), states cannot enact any "statute, regulation, order,
interpretation, or other action" that prevents or restricts depository insti-
tution affiliations or associations authorized by any federal law.
72
Section 104 fails to define "other action." Thus, prudent states
must take a hands-off approach to depository institution affiliations and
insurance activities or face a potential challenge from federal banking,
insurance and securities regulators.73
70. See GLBA § 104(d)(l); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 251 (1999) (stating that
"[e]xcept with respect to insurance, states may not prevent or restrict a depository institution or
affiliate thereof from engaging in any activity set forth under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act").
71. GLBA § 104(c)(1) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 38 (stating that "although
developed with a focus on insurance anti-affiliation laws, [section 104(c)] is not limited to
insurance, but by its terms reaches any State law that adversely affects affiliations with a
[depository institution]").
73. GLBA § 104(c)(1), § 104(d)(l) & (2); see also Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra
note 11, at 38. The states legislative hands are truly tied by section 104:
The preemption provisions cover not only [depository institutions] in a [financial
holding company], but all insured [depository institutions], foreign banks with a
U.S. branch, agency, or commercial lending company, and all affiliations with
[depository institutions] permitted under the Act. It reaches persons or entities
"associated" with a [depository institution] or [financial holding company] but does
not define "associate." In context that term would appear to cover a joint venture,
contractual, or other relationships among individuals, companies, or other persons
engaged in financial or other activities covered by this subsection. Any person or
entity "engaged in the business of insurance" is an "insurer" for purposes of these
affiliation provisions,
Id. at 38.
Interestingly, unlike many of GLBA's sections, section 104 fails to appoint a primary regulator to
interpret its provisions. Thus, the efforts of the banking and insurance regulators, coupled with
foreseeable litigation, will eventually define its pervasive scope. See GLBA § 104; see also Gib-
son, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 35. See generally Robert C. Eager & Cantwell F.
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Additionally, although the preemption provisions reach persons or
entities "associated" with either a depository institution or a financial
holding company, section 104 does not define the term "associate."74 In
the context of section 104, the term would seem to cover joint venture,
contractual, or other relationships between individuals, companies or
other persons engaging in financial or other activities allowed under the
GLBA or other federal law."
1. INSURANCE SALES BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
Recognizing the right of depository institutions to engage in insur-
ance sales, solicitation and cross - marketing activities, Congress incor-
porated the legal standard for preemption from Barnett Bank of Marion
County N.A. v. Nelson76 into section 104(d)(2).77 Under the section, "no
state may . . . prevent or significantly interfere with the ability of a
depository institution, or an affiliate thereof, to engage, directly or indi-
rectly, either by itself or in conjunction with an affiliate or any other
person, in any insurance sales, solicitation, or cross marketing activ-
ity."' 78 In declaring this right, however, Congress also emphasized that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act,79 recognizing the states' role as the pri-
mary regulators of the insurance industry, remains the law of the United
States.80
Muckenfuss III, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New Federal Preemption Rules Concerning
Insurance and Other Affiliations of Depository Institutions: Section 104 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Nov. 30, 1999, at I (stating that "[t]hese provisions apply to any type of affiliation with
any depository institution, not just the financial holding companies ... authorized in Section 103
of the new Act"). Whether the banking, insurance and securities regulators would in fact have
standing to challenge a state's overreaching is beyond the scope of this Article.
74. See GLBA § 104(c)(1); see also Eager & Muckenfuss III, supra note 73, at 4 (discussing
the expansive preemption of state law under section 104).
75. See id. at 4 (discussing the reach of the term "associate").
76. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
77. GLBA § 104(d)(2)(A). This section codifies the Supreme Court holding in Barnett Bank
of Marion County N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 251
(1999) (stating that "[w]ith respect to insurance sales, solicitations, and cross-marketing, States
may not prevent or significantly interfere with the activities of depository institutions or their
affiliates, as set forth in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)").
78. Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1945).
80. GLBA § 104; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 251 (stating that
[t]his section reaffirms the McCarran-Ferguson Act, recognizing the primacy and
legal authority of the States to regulate insurance activities of all persons. No
persons are permitted to engage in the business of insurance unless they are licensed
by the States, as required under State law. States are not allowed to prevent certain
affiliations or activities or discriminate against depository institutions in providing
such insurance licenses).
After section 104, it appears that the states' only remaining power to regulate insurance
activities is through the states' licensing authority and privacy laws. See infra Part IV for a dis-
cussion of the GLBA's privacy provisions.
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act states that "no Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any
state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."'" Thus, in
accordance with Barnett Bank and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, state
law cannot override, restrict or significantly interfere with a federal law,
such as section 104(d)(2)(A), that specifically relates to the business of
insurance.82 Therefore, if an entity engaged in insurance sales has a
depository institution affiliate, section 104(d)(2)(A) will preempt such
state rules that apply solely to the insurance sales activities of that
entity.83
Section 104 establishes a two-part preemption test for state laws
governing the insurance sales, solicitation or cross - marketing activities
of depository institutions and their affiliates. The GLBA preempts state
laws governing insurance sales by depository institutions if the laws
either "prevent or significantly interfere with" the aforementioned activi-
ties, in accordance with Barnett Bank, or are discriminatory under a
four-pronged test.84 Thus, under section 104(e), a state law is discrimi-
natory if it: (1) distinguishes by its terms between depository institutions
or their affiliates and other persons engaged in insurance activities
authorized by the GLBA in an adverse manner; (2) as interpreted or
applied, has a substantially more adverse impact on depository institu-
tions and their affiliates than on other persons providing the same prod-
ucts or services or engaging in the same activities; (3) effectively
prevents depository institutions or their affiliates from engaging in insur-
ance activities authorized by the GLBA or other federal law; or (4) con-
flicts with the GLBA's general intent to permit affiliations authorized by
federal law between depository institutions or their affiliates and persons
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
82. See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 37-38; see also Eager & Muckenfuss 1II, supra note 73, at
3 ("[U]nder [the McCarran-Ferguson] Act, the 'business of insurance' is subject to State
regulation, except to the extent that a Federal statute (such as Section 104 of the [Gramm-Leach-
Bliley] Act) 'specifically relates' to insurance"). Although the GLBA reaffirms McCarran-
Ferguson's protection of the states primary regulators of the insurance industry, where such
regulators have tried to block certain insurance company-takeover bids, courts have denied
deference to state insurance commissioners, holding that they were unduly interfering with federal
securities laws or the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See HERLIHY, supra note 13, at 105
(citing Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Huddleston, No. 3:90-0368, slip op. at 2 (M.D.
Tenn. May 1, 1990), aff'd, No. 90-5598 (6th Cir. May 2, 1990) (motion to stay denied); Alleghany
Corp. v. Pomeroy, 700 F. Supp. 460 (D.N.D. 1988) (enjoining South Dakota commissioners from
blocking acquisition of St. Paul Companies, Inc.) rev'd 898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990) (reversing
on procedural grounds)).
83. See Eager & Muckenfuss III, supra note 73, at 8.
84. See GLBA §§ 104(d)(2)(A), 104(e).
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engaged in the insurance business. If a state law fails any one of the
four discrimination prongs, the GLBA will preempt the law. However,
the section 104(e) discrimination test generally does not apply to any
state law regarding insurance sales, solicitation, or cross-marketing
activities enacted before September 3, 1998, or to state laws falling
within one of thirteen "safe harbors. 86
2. INSURANCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SALES
To avoid federal preemption, state laws that govern insurance activ-
ities other than sales must meet the following four-part test. The state
laws must (1) relate to or are issued for the purpose of regulating the
insurance business in accordance with the McCarran-Ferguson Act; (2)
apply only to persons, not depository institutions, that are directly
engaged in the insurance business; (3) not relate to or regulate either
directly or indirectly insurance sales, solicitation or cross marketing
activities; and (4) not be discriminatory under the aforementioned sec-
tion 104(e) four-pronged test.87 Thus, if state regulations are consistent
with this test, the states may continue regulating insurance activities
other than sales, solicitation and cross marketing without fearing federal
preemption.88
3. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN INSURANCE
Finally, state laws governing financial activities other than insur-
ance must meet the following four-part test to avoid preemption. The
state laws must (1) not govern insurance sales; (2) not govern insurance
activities other than sales; (3) not relate to securities investigations or
enforcement actions addressed in section 104(0; and (4) meet approxi-
mately the same nondiscrimination test as provided in section 104(e).89
Thus, state regulations of financial activities other than insurance that
pass the nondiscrimination prong will survive federal preemption. 90
B. Safe Harbors
Section 104 does include thirteen safe harbors, i.e., areas where
states may regulate free from the threat of federal preemption. 9' How-
85. See id.
86. § 104(d)(2)(C)(ii). For a description of the applicable safe harbors, see § 104(d)(2)(B);
supra Section B.




91. See GLBA § 104(d)(2)(B); see also Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at
43. Briefly, the thirteen safe harbors govern (1) protection of unassociated insurance issuers or
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ever, these safe harbors conceal a rather dangerous undertow. The safe
harbors are not subject to federal preemption as long as they are "sub-
stantially the same as but no more burdensome or restrictive than" those
listed in section 104(d)(2)(B).92 Thus, the GLBA does in fact preempt
the states' power to regulate in the safe harbor areas because the states
cannot exceed the federal ceiling. Rather than insure some level of state
autonomy, section 104(d)(2)(B) merely supplies an additional preemp-
tion test.
93
C. Expedited Judicial Review
If a state insurance regulator and federal regulator disagree over
whether the GLBA preempts state law, either party may seek expedited
review by a United States Court of Appeals.94
Significantly, the court shall decide the petition using a "without-
unequal-deference" standard of review.95 Thus, under these circum-
stances, the court is no longer obliged to give the Federal Banking
Agencies deference in accordance with Chevron v. National Resources
Defense Council 6 and Barnett Bank; rather, both sides will be viewed
equally.97 However, the court will not apply the without-unequal-defer-
ence standard to a state law regarding insurance sales, solicitation, or
cross-marketing activities enacted before September 3, 1998, or falling
within one of the aforementioned thirteen safe harbors.98
Therefore, by using if not vague than certainly overbroad language,
Congress, through section 104, covers a wide range of state laws with a
underwriters; (2) charging a single fee for insurance services; (3) advertising restrictions; (4) state
licensing requirements; (5) referral fee restrictions; (6) privacy requirements for policy-holder
information; (7) privacy requirements for policy-holders' health information; (8) restrictions on
conditioning credit approval on purchasing insurance; (9) restrictions requiring notice to policy
holders that their choice of insurance provider will not affect final decisions regarding pending
loan or credit applications; (10) disclosing insurance risks; (11) separating credit and insurance
transactions; (12) excluding the expense of insurance premiums in the primary credit transaction
unless the customer consents; and (13) requiring banking institutions to maintain separate books
and records for insurance transactions. See generally William Anderson, State-Level Implications
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, ADvISOR TODAY, Mar. 1, 2000 (discussing the thirteen safe harbors).
92. GLBA § 104(d)(2)(B).
93. Section 104(d)(2)(B) does not include a severability clause; thus, instead of failing only to
the extent that they exceed the permissible bounds of the safe harbor, state rules or actions that
exceed the boundaries of a particular safe harbor may fail in their entirety. See Eager &
Muckenfuss III, supra note 73, at 10.
94. See GLBA § 304; see also Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary supra note 11, at 41
(summarizing GLBA).
95. GLBA § 304.
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. See Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 41; see also BENSON ET. AL.,
supra note 12 (discussing the Chevron and Barnett decisions).
98. See GLBA §§ 104(d)(2)(C), 304(e).
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blanket federal preemption standard. Additionally, Congress' safe
harbors, facially pro-state, are tied to a federal ceiling provision that lim-
its any real state-level legislative freedom. However, section 104 merely
marks the beginning of one's journey into the GLBA's labyrinth of pre-
emption principles.
III. INSURANCE ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL BANKS
The GLBA enables banks to engage in insurance activities through
a financial holding company and financial subsidiary. Additionally,
Title III of the GLBA enables national banks to engage in insurance
activities directly, with some limitations. In authorizing these powers,
Congress builds on a foundation of Supreme Court precedent supporting
a national bank's right to engage in insurance activities.
A. Judicial Rulings in the Years Leading Up to GLBA
In the 1980s, two Supreme Court cases chipped away at the legal
framework supporting insurance companies' opposition to affiliations
with banks. Nations Bank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.99 upheld an
OCC determination that annuities do not fall within the definition of
"insurance." Thus, under the National Bank Act, banks may sell annui-
ties as a service to banking customers. I0 Additionally, Barnett Bank
upheld another OCC determination that, under the National Bank Act's
express authority, national banks may sell insurance in towns with popu-
lations of 5,000 or less.10' The Court held that since the National Bank
Act expressly allows certain national banks to sell insurance in small
towns, the Act "specifically relates to the business of insurance."' 02
Thus, the Court did not apply McCarran-Ferguson's anti-federal pre-
emption rule. 103 By affirming the federal statutory authority for a
national bank's insurance activities, these cases paved the way for
GLBA's preemption and insurance provisions.
B. The Title III Provisions
Title III of the GLBA begins by declaring that states remain the
functional regulators of insurance activities, including a national bank's
insurance activities; however, this acknowledgement is subject to the
99. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
100. See id. at 252; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 19, at 152; Gibson, Dunn, Working
Summary, supra note 11, at 50 (discussing the case).
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GLBA's sweeping section 104 preemption standard."° Thus, under sec-
tion 104's broadest language, states can regulate the insurance business,
as long as they do nothing to prevent or restrict depository institutions or
their affiliates from affiliating directly or indirectly or (2) associating
with any person, as authorized by the GLBA or any other federal law.
Since the GLBA does not define the term "restrict," one can envision
depository institutions and/or their affiliates litigating over whether a
particular state "statute, regulation, order, interpretation, or other
action"' 5 restricts their affiliation rights. In fact, one can further envi-
sion litigation over what Congress meant by "other action."
As aforementioned, section 121 enables a bank's financial subsidi-
ary to engage in certain insurance activities. Under section 302, how-
ever a national bank and its subsidiaries may not provide insurance in
states as a principal except for certain "authorized products."' °6 A prod-
uct is authorized if (1) as of January 1, 1999, a national bank was law-
fully providing the product or has the OCC's written permission to
provide it; (2) a court by final judgment had not overturned the OCC's
determination; and (3) the product is not subject to tax treatment as an
annuity or title insurance under the Internal Revenue Code. 0 7 Gener-
ally, the state insurance regulators retain the discretion to define insur-
ance.0 8 Additionally, with some exceptions, a national bank may not
engage in activities involving underwriting or selling title insurance."
C. The Insurance Customer Protection Regulations
Section 305 of the GLBA amends the FDIA, adding new section 47
to govern insurance customer protections. Under section 47, the federal
banking agencies (e.g., FRB, OCC, OTS and FDIC) must prescribe joint
regulations that apply to "retail sales practices, solicitations, advertising,
or offers of any insurance product" by a depository institution and, if the
federal banking regulators so determine, a depository institution's affili-
104. See GLBA § 104; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 261 (1999) (discussing the states'
role as functional regulator of the insurance business).
105. GLBA § 104.
106. See § 302.
107. See id.
108. See id.; see also Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 51 (summarizing the
GLBA). Interestingly, the Act expressly includes "any annuity contract, the income of which is
subject to tax treatment under section 7702 of the Internal Revenue Code" under its definition of
"insurance." Thus, by including annuities within the definition of insurance, the GLBA reverses
the Supreme Court's determination in VALIC that annuities were not "insurance." See GLBA
§ 302; see also Nations Bank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (holding that
an annuity is not insurance); Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 1I, at 52 (comparing
GLBA's definition of "insurance" with the VALIC case).
109. See GLBA § 303.
20011
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ates; and are consistent with the GLBA and "provide such additional
protections for customers to whom such sales, solicitations, advertising,
or offers are directed."" The new section 47 specifically relates to the
business of insurance, thus activating the McCarran-Ferguson preemp-
tion standard. Therefore, subject to certain federally mandated
allowances, section 47 will preempt state law."'
In particular, section 47 expressly requires that the federal banking
agencies' regulations include rules relating to (1) anti-tying and anti-
coercive sales practices; (2) disclosures and advertising; (3) separation
of banking and nonbanking activities; (4) domestic violence discrimina-
tion prohibitions; and (5) consumer grievance processes.' 12 First, under
the anti-coercion and anti-tying rules, a depository institution cannot
lead a customer to believe that an extension of credit is conditioned upon
purchasing insurance or agreeing not to obtain, or prohibiting the cus-
tomer from obtaining, insurance from an unaffiliated entity." 3 Second,
depository institutions must make the following disclosures orally and in
writing with respect to initial purchases of insurance products before
completion of the initial sale: (1) that the FDIC, U. S. government and
the depository institution do not insure the product; and (2) the product
is associated with an investment risk, if the product is a variable annuity
or other insurance product involving such risk." 4  Additionally, at the
time of application for an extension of credit, the depository institution
must disclose that approval of such extensions is governed by the afore-
mentioned anti-tying and anti-coercion rules." 1
5
110. § 305.
111. See supra page Part II.A. 1; GLBA § 305 (adding section 47 to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)); Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress,
supra note 59, at 15. Such regulations are designed to protect customers who are offered such
insurance products. The regulations contain the following four major requirements. (1) must
provide antitying and anticoercion rules prohibiting a depository institution from leading a
customer to believe that an extension of credit is conditioned upon either purchasing an insurance
product from the institution or its affiliates; (2) must make certain disclosures in advertising; (3)
must physically separate banking and nonbanking (insurance product) activities; and (4) must
prohibit discrimination against domestic violence victims. Significantly, section 305(2) applies
these regulations to subsidiaries of a depository institution, if necessary to ensure the required
customer protection.
112. See GLBA § 305 (adding section 47 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, 12
U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)).
113. See id. One should note that section 47(b) uses the terms "customer" and "consumer"
interchangeably. See Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 72 (stating that "the
regulations ... shall include antitying and anticoercion rules ... that prohibit a depository
institution from engaging in any practice that would lead a customer to believe that an extension
of credit ... is conditioned upon ... an agreement by the consumer not to obtain ... an insurance
product from an unaffiliated entity").
114. See GLBA § 305 (adding section 47(c)(1)(A) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)).
115. See id.
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Third, the regulations must include provisions appropriate to ensure
that routine deposit acceptance and insurance product activities are
physically segregated." 16 These provisions require: (1) separate settings
for deposit acceptance and insurance product transactions; (2) standards
that permit persons accepting deposits to refer customers wishing to
purchase insurance products to a qualified seller; and (3) standards
prohibiting a depository institution from permitting inappropriately qual-
ified or licensed persons to sell or offer for sale any insurance
products. ' 7
Fourth, unless state law otherwise requires or expressly permits
such consideration, the depository institution shall not consider the sta-
tus of an applicant or an insured as a victim of domestic violence or as a
provider of services to domestic violence victims in any decision regard-
ing "insurance underwriting, pricing, renewal, scope of coverage of
insurance policies, or payment of insurance claims." '" 8 Fifth, the federal
banking regulators must jointly create a consumer complaint mechanism
to address alleged violations of the insurance customer protection
regulations. '9
Generally, the federal banking agencies' insurance customer pro-
tection regulations will not apply to states with statutes, regulations,
orders or interpretations that are inconsistent with or contrary to their
regulations.12 0 However, section 47(g)(2)(B) expressly states that if the
FRB, OCC and FDIC determine jointly that any provision of their regu-
lations affords greater protection to customers than does the comparable
state provision, they shall notify the appropriate state regulatory author-
ity in writing of their initial determination and, after considering com-
ments submitted by the appropriate state regulatory authorities, make a
final determination concerning the status of the state provision. 12  If,
after considering such comments, the federal banking agencies deter-
mine that their regulations afford greater protection than the state provi-
sions, then they will send a written preemption notice to the appropriate
state regulatory authority. 2 The notice will inform the state that the
"federal provision will preempt the state provision and will become
applicable unless, no later than three years after the date of such notice,
116. See id. (adding section 47(d)).
117. See id.
118. See id. (adopting section 47(e)).
119. See id. (adopting section 47(f)).
120. See id. (adding section 47(g)(2)(B)(iii) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, 12
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the state adopts legislation to override such preemption."' 123
Therefore, the federal regulations represent a floor standard for
insurance customer protections. Although the federal banking agencies
will not preempt state laws that provide greater customer protection than
the federal regulations, they will preempt state provisions that are
weaker than the federal floor. However, states can agree to adopt legis-
lation to override the preemption within three years. 124 Thus, although
Congress has the authority under the McCarran-Ferguson Act to pre-
empt state law with federal regulations specifically related to the insur-
ance business, the GLBA offers states the override option. 25  Even
though this anti-preemption provision provides the states with some lati-
tude, one should note that to avoid preemption, any new state insurance
customer protection legislation must be equivalent to or tougher than the
federal banking agencies' regulations.
D. What About Preemption Under Section 104?
Surprisingly, GLBA section 305 does not relate back to the pre-
emption provisions in section 104.126 Thus, the GLBA does not recon-
cile section 104's broad preemption of state law, particularly state law
dealing with the insurance business, with the language that is somewhat
more protective of state law in section 305. Because section 305 does
not cross-reference section 104, states could argue that Congress
intended section 305 to fall outside of section 104 preemption. 27 Such
an argument, however, would fail against section 104's blanket preemp-
tion of state law.
Section 104's preemption standard covers any state action that pre-
vents or restricts affiliations and associations authorized by the GLBA or
any other federal law governing depository institutions. Specifically,
states may not prevent or restrict a depository institution's insurance
activities as authorized by the GLBA. Thus, since state insurance cus-
123. Id. (adding section 47(g)(2)(B)(iii) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, 12
U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)). This type of "choice" is constitutionally permissible "[w]here Federal
regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the
ability of Congress to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to Federal
standards or having State law preempted by Federal regulation." New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 173-74 (1992).
124. See GLBA § 305 (adding section 47(g)(2)(B)(iii) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)).
125. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt.
Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 105-09 (1992) (discussing how the preemption doctrine evolved from the
Supremacy Clause and how federal statutes can expressly or impliedly preempt state laws in the
same field).
126. See Gibson, Dunn, Working Summary, supra note 11, at 71, 74.
127. See generally id. (discussing the failure of section 104 to cross-reference section 305).
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tomer protection regulations may affect the activities of depository insti-
tutions and their affiliates, section 104 will apply to the extent that the
state regulations prevent or restrict the GLBA-approved insurance activ-
ities of depository institutions and their affiliates.
1 28
Since Congress did not define the word "restrict" in section 104, a
depository institution could argue that a state's tougher insurance cus-
tomer protection provisions "restrict" its ability to affiliate or associate
with the insurance business. Therefore, although tougher state customer
protection provisions are not subject to federal preemption under new
section 47 of the FDIA, they could face preemption under section 104 of
the GLBA. As such, states are facing a potential lose/lose situation: the
federal banking regulators can preempt weaker state customer protection
provisions under section 305, subject to a three-year window for the
states to enact legislation to override the preemption, and section 104
could potentially preempt stronger provisions.
With the advent of the insurance customer protection regulations,
the states gain an opportunity to strike back at the section 104 preemp-
tion provisions, at least in theory. However, the effect of section 104
upon Title III further strains the McCarran-Ferguson Act's declaration
that the states regulate the insurance business according to state law. As
a result, this declaration, once a terror, erodes toward mere tautology.
Surprisingly, Title III shares a unique connection to the privacy provi-
sions in Title V, a connection which raises questions regarding the con-
stitutionality of Title V.
IV. TITLE V: PROTECTING NONPUBLIC PERSONAL INFORMATION
12 9
The privacy provisions of Title V of the GLBA begin by declaring
that each financial institution owes its customers a continuing obligation
to respect their privacy and the security and confidentiality of their non-
public personal information.130 To further this general policy, the FRB,
128. See id. (stating that "[tihe better reading would subject State insurance laws that may be
regarded as referenced in new FDI Act section 47 to the framework for preemption regarding
insurance activities under section 104").
129. Title V is broken up into two subtitles. Subtitle A, the focus of Part IV of this article, is
entitled "Disclosure of Nonpublic Information." Subtitle B, entitled "Fraudulent Access to
Financial Information," is not discussed in Part IV because it is beyond the scope of this article.
130. See GLBA § 501. Nonpublic personal information includes information obtained by the
financial institution from: (1) the consumer; (2) the institution's own transactions or experiences
with the customer; and (3) any third-party source. See Fischer & Camper, supra note 6. Thus,
unlike the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970), the GLBA does not
exempt the disclosure of transactional or experiential information from the scope of its privacy
provision. The provision, however, does not include nonfinancial demographic data,
depersonalized information used for analytical purposes, or publicly available information.
Significantly, the privacy provisions govern consumers, not business customers. Thus, the title
applies only to those individuals who obtain from the financial institution financial products or
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OCC, FDIC, NCUA, SEC and FTC, after consultation with state insur-
ance authorities, must promulgate privacy standards for financial institu-
tions falling within their jurisdiction.1 3 1 Thus, the agencies and
authorities must prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of Title
V.W 132 Although the House bill would have required the agencies and
authorities listed above to issue a joint privacy regulation, 3 3 the GLBA,
as passed, only requires that they consult and coordinate with each other
to produce, to the extent possible, consistent and comparable
regulations. 134
According to Title V, financial institutions must have privacy poli-
cies in place by November 12, 2000, one year after the GLBA was
enacted into law. 135  However, the federal agencies, using their power
under the GLBA to extend the deadline, have postponed the effective
date for compliance until July 1, 2001.1'6 Additionally, if a state insur-
services primarily for personal, family or household purposes. See Fischer & Camper, supra note
6.
131. See GLBA § 501; see also Conlon, supra note 66, at 26 (summarizing the Title V privacy
provisions). Congress did not specify what it meant by "standards," leaving one group of
attorneys to speculate about the potential confusion caused by this oversight. See Gibson, Dunn,
supra note 11, at 78 (stating that "it is not clear whether the term 'standards' necessarily requires
rulemaking. It is quite possible that a regulator could issue a loose directive to protect the security
and confidentiality of customer records, while another could issue detailed regulations covering a
wide range of activity").
132. See GLBA § 504(a). Under the GLBA, a "financial" institution encompasses a wide
variety of institutions, including mortgage, finance and travel agency companies. See Regulatory
Advisory Service Practice of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Executive Overview and Summary of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Nov. 15, 1999, at 15.
133. Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 504(a) (1999).
134. See GLBA § 504(b) (deleting language requiring the regulators to "jointly prescribe"
privacy regulations); H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 265 (1999) (amending the House position that
called for joint rulemaking by allowing the regulators to separately prescribe privacy rules).
135. See GLBA §§ 504(a)(3) & 510. Federal agencies must prescribe privacy regulations
within six months after the Act's enactment. Within six months after the federal agencies propose
their regulations, the financial institutions must prescribe their privacy policies in accordance with
their respective agency's regulations. Almost immediately after the agencies presented their
proposed regulations, the banking industry requested more time, at minimum, August 2001 and, at
maximum, March 2002, to implement its privacy policies. See Michelle Heller, Banks Want More
Time on Reform's Privacy Rules, AM. BANKER, Apr. 12, 2000. Fascinatingly, claiming the
mandated privacy notices would overwhelm the public mailing system during the already
overpowering holiday season, financial services companies urged the federal regulators to extend,
for as long as a year and a half, the deadline for financial institutions to give their customers
mandated privacy notices. See Michelle Heller, Bankers See Christmas-Mail Meltdown for
Privacy Notices, AM. BANKER, Apr. 12, 2000. However, the Postal Service has assured the
financial services industry that it can handle the workload. See id. (stating that "[i]t wouldn't be a
problem at all . . . [w]e would welcome the business").
136. See GLBA § 5 10(1). The FRB, OCC, OTS, FDIC, FTC, NCUA and SEC have all
postponed the effective date of the privacy protections until July 1, 2001. See Joint Final Rule by
the Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35215 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35225 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332); Department
of the Treasury (OCC and OTS) 65 Fed. Reg. 35205, 35235 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12
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ance authority fails to enact legislation consistent with the GLBA pri-
vacy provisions, then new FDIA section 47(g)(2)(B)(iii) renders the
state ineligible to override the federal banking agencies' insurance cus-
tomer protection regulations.
13 7
A. The Privacy Provisions
Generally, a financial institution may not disclose, directly or
through an affiliate, a customer's nonpublic personal information to a
nonaffiliated third party without first providing the customer with clear
and conspicuous notice that such information may be disclosed and an
opportunity to opt out. 138 Under the notice requirement, once a financial
institution establishes its privacy policies in accordance with the applica-
ble regulatory framework, it must clearly and conspicuously disclose
these policies to its consumers at the time it establishes a customer rela-
tionship with a consumer and no less than annually during the customer
relationship.139 If a consumer never becomes a customer, then the finan-
cial institution need not provide any notices unless the institution plans
to disclose the consumer's personal, nonpublic information to nonaf-
filiated third parties. 140
C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33687 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31749 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 716 & 741); SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40371 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 248); see also Dean Anason, Privacy Rules' Effective Date Seen Delayed to Mid-2001, AM.
BANKER, May 5, 2000, at 1 (discussing the federal agencies' decision to postpone the deadline).
Interestingly, section 504 does not impose a similar deadline for the states to enact privacy
policies under insurance law. Thus, one could interpret Title V as allowing states a carte blanche
timetable for enacting privacy policies on behalf of the insurance industry.
137. See GLBA § 505(c).
138. See §§ 502-503.
139. See § 503(a); see also Fischer & Camper, supra note 6 ("[O]ne of the most important
features of the privacy title is the first federally mandated disclosure of a financial institution's
privacy policy."). Section 509(11) directs the agencies and authorities to define "customer
relationship" in their regulations. See GLBA § 509(11). However, section 509(11) does state
that, in cases where a financial institution extends financing credit directly to consumers for
purchases of goods and services, a "customer relationship" means the time that the financial
institution establishes a credit relationship with a consumer. See id. The notice must be in writing
or, if the consumer agrees, in electronic form; however, the federal agencies' proposed rules
expressly forbid oral notification. See § 503; Joint Final Rule by the Federal Reserve System, 65
Fed. Reg. 35209-10 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FDIC, 65 Fed.
Reg. 35219-20 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury
(OCC and OTS) 65 Fed. Reg. 35199-200, 35229-30 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33659-60 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742-43 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741); SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40368-69 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
140. See GLBA § 503; Joint Final Rule by the Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35209-10
(June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35219-20 (June 1,
2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS) 65 Fed.
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This disclosure must provide the financial institution's policies
regarding the sharing of nonpublic personal information with affiliated
and nonaffiliated third parties, including (1) the types of information
subject to disclosure; (2) the disclosure of a former customer's nonpub-
lic personal information; and (3) the protection of consumers' nonpublic
personal information.' 4 ' Importantly, when an institution discloses its
privacy policy, it must include information regarding: (1) the institu-
tion's policy of disclosing personal nonpublic information to nonaf-
filiated third parties that are not agents of the institution, (including the
categories of persons who may receive the information and the institu-
tion's disclosures regarding former customers); (2) the categories of
nonpublic personal information subject to collection; (3) the policies
maintained to protect the security and confidentiality of nonpublic per-
sonal information, and (4) the required affiliate disclosures under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act.
4 2
Under the opt-out requirement, a consumer is given an opportunity,
before the financial institution discloses the information, to direct the
financial institution not to disclose the information to nonaffiliated third
parties. 4 3 Unless consumers expressly bar a financial institution from
sharing their information, the opt-out model assumes that the institution
will share the information. 144 Thus, if consumers neglect to respond, the
financial institution may freely disclose their nonpublic personal
information. 145
Reg. 35199-200, 35229-30 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final
Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33659-60 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final
Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742-43 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741); SEC
Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365-66 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
141. Fischer & Camper, supra note 6; see GLBA § 502; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at
266 (1999) ("The Conferees agreed to clarify that a financial institution's annual disclosure of its
privacy policy to its customers must include a Statement of the institution's policies and practices
regarding the sharing of nonpublic personal information with affiliated entities, as well as with
nonaffiliated third parties.").
142. See GLBA § 503(b)(4).
143. § 502(b)(1)(A) & (B). The financial institution also must explain how the consumer may
exercise the opt-out right. § 502(b)(1)(C). See generally William Anderson, State-Level
Implications of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, ADVISOR TODAY, Mar. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL
15516374 (discussing the privacy provisions).
144. See GLBA § 502(b)(1)(B). An opt-out mechanism assumes that financial institutions will
share consumer information unless the consumer expressly bars such action; an opt-in model is
stricter, prohibiting a financial institution from sharing consumer information without the
consumer's prior consent. See Michelle Heller, Calif. to Be Test Bed for Data Privacy
Legislation, AM. BANKER, Apr. 7, 2000 (discussing two California privacy bills that include opt-in
mechanisms); Ren Wijnen, Privacy Matters in the Digital Age, BANK TECH. NEWS, Apr. 3, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 17153362 (discussing the difference between an opt-out and opt-in
mechanism).
145. See Congressional Privacy Caucus, Comments oh Proposed Regarding Privacy of
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B. New Phrases, Complex Definitions and the Scope of Title V
Title V includes many new phrases and complex sets of definitions
that supposedly help to define its structure and scope. Unfortunately,
instead of facilitating a clean understanding of Title V, Congress' and
the federal agencies' attempts at defining these new phrases have caused
greater confusion. Such attempts only add to the difficulty that financial
holding companies will eventually face in trying to implement the pri-
vacy regulations.' 46 Indeed, Title V covers a wide range of information,
financial institutions and activities. Depending on how Title V defines
certain terms, the privacy regulations may or may not apply to a given
financial institution.14 Confusing or not, the definitions present the
only way for a financial holding company to truly comprehend it's obli-
gations under Title V.
1. CONSUMER VERSUS CUSTOMER
Title V distinguishes between consumers and customers. A con-
sumer is an individual who obtains financial products or services from a
financial institution primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses.'4 8 With its focus on personal, family or household purposes, this
definition of consumer arguably excludes businesses and corpora-
tions.14 9
A customer is a consumer who has a customer relationship with the
Consumer Financial Information, (Mar. 31, 2000) available at http://www.house.gov/markey/
cpfstat33100.htm.
146. See Goodwin, Procter & Hoar LLP, Proposed Privacy Regulations Released by OCC and
FRB (Feb. 9, 2000) available at 2000 WL 9237979 (discussing the differences between the FRB's
and OCC's definitions of "publicly- available information"); SEC Issues Proposed Privacy Rules
(Mar. 8, 2000) available at 2000 WL 9238164 (discussing the differences between the SEC's
proposals and those from the other Federal agencies). See generally FTC Seeks Public Comment
on Proposed Financial Privacy Rule (Feb. 25, 2000) available at 2000 WL 12936223 (discussing
the FTC's proposed privacy regulations). But see Congressional Privacy Caucus, Comments on
Proposed Rules Regarding Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Mar. 31, 2000) (stating
that the agencies' proposed rules contain only minor differences); but see also Edward Staples,
Finance Industry Opts for 'Opt-Out' on Cross-Marketing, ADVISOR TODAY, Mar. 1, 2000, at 32,
available 2000 WL 15516361 (discussing Letter from the Electronic Financial Services Council to
the Federal Agencies (Mar. 31, 2000) available at http://www.efscouncil.org/frames/
Recent%20Activities/FINALCOM.htm ("The versions of the proposed rule ... published so far
are very similar to one another ....")).
147. See Fischer & Camper, supra note 6 ("To understand the effects of the privacy title, one
must first grasp its key definitions.").
148. See GLBA § 509(9). Significantly, nothing in this definition limits its coverage to U.S.
residents.
149. See Fischer & Camper, supra note 6 ("It is important to note that the privacy title governs
only nonpublic personal information of consumers and does not cover an institution's business
customers.").
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financial institution. 50  Generally, a customer relationship exists when
the financial institution and the consumer have a continuing relationship;
such relationship exists when the financial institution provides the con-
sumer with one or more financial products or services primarily for per-
sonal, family or household purposes. 151  However, this definition does
not include the following situations: 1) using (either once or on repeated
occasions) an automated teller machine at a bank or credit union at
which a consumer transacts no other business; 2) cashing a check at such
an institution; 3) purchasing travelers checks or money orders, or mak-
ing a wire transfer at such an institution; 4) purchasing airline tickets; or
5) purchasing securities from a broker who has provided the service as
an accommodation for a consumer when the broker does so on a one-
time basis. 152  In these circumstances, the financial institution is not
obligated to disclose its privacy policy to the consumer.153
As one might expect, the situations where a consumer would not
have a continuing relationship (and thus a customer relationship) with a
securities firm are more limited. According to the SEC's Final Rule on
privacy of consumer financial information, a consumer does not have a
continuing relationship with a securities firm if the firm "opens an
account for the consumer solely for the purpose of liquidating or
purchasing securities as an accommodation, i.e., on a one time basis,
150. See Joint Final Rule by the Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35207-08 (June 1,
2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35218 (proposed Feb. 22, 2000)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 Fed. Reg.
35197, 35228 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed.
Reg. 33679 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
31741 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741); SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
40364 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
151. See Joint Final Rule by the Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35207-08 (June 1,
2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35218 (June 1, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 C.F.R. 35197,
35228 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 C.F.R.
33679 (June 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40364
(June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248). In contrast to the other agencies, the NCUA
defines "customer relationship" as "a continuing relationship between a consumer and a financial
institution other than a credit union." NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31741 (May 18, 2000) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741).
152. For a more thorough discussion of the exceptions, see FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35228 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216,
332, 573); FRS/FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35218; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35208; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65
Fed. Reg. at 35198; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, Fed. Reg. 33679 (May 24,
2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 10990 (Mar. 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716,741).
153. See GLBA § 503(a) ("at the time of establishing a customer relationship with a consumer
and not less than annually during the continuation of such relationship, a financial institution shall
provide clear and conspicuous disclosure .. .of such institution's [disclosure] policies and
practices ....") (emphasis added).
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without the expectation of engaging in other transactions." 154 However,
this definitional tailoring by the SEC, as opposed to the other federal
agencies, could create regulatory difficulties for financial holding
companies.
2. "FINANCIAL INSTITUTION" . . . EVERYTHING BUT THE
KITCHEN SINK
In general, a "financial institution" is "any institution the business
of which is engaging in financial activities as described in section 4(k)
of the Bank Holding Company Act." '155 Thus, any institution that
engages in activities that are financial in nature, incidental to such finan-
cial activity or complementary to a financial activity, must establish pri-
vacy policies according to Title V. 156 Significantly, Title V applies to all
companies that fall within the expansive definition of "financial institu-
tion," regardless of whether they own or are affiliated with a bank or
thrift.'
57
3. NONAFFILIATED THIRD PARTY
A "nonaffiliated third party" is defined as "any entity that is not an
affiliate of, or related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate
control with, the financial institution."' 58 An "affiliate" therefore, is
defined as "any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under com-
mon control with another company." 159  For Title V purposes, the defi-
154. SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40364 (June 29, 2000) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
155. See GLBA § 509(3).
156. § 103(a) (amending the BHCA by adding new Section 4(k)).
157. See Memorandum from Bob Eager et al., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New Federal
Privacy Requirements Affecting Any Company Engaged in "Financial" Business 1 (Jan. 15,
2000). Obviously, the definition covers companies providing banking, lending, securities,
insurance or trust activities. See id. This coverage extends to companies that collect consumer
information from or about its customers, as well as companies that receive such information from
a financial company. See supra note 156. Additionally, this definition's scope will very likely
envelop companies that: (1) finance sales of products to consumers via credit extensions or leases;
(2) provide services to banking, lending, securities, insurance or trust service providers; (3) travel
agencies, data processing and financial software companies and "outsource" service providers to
any financial company; and (4) companies providing economic, financial, investment,
management or employee benefits consulting or advisory services. See id. Thus, these companies
must establish privacy policies in accordance with their functional regulator's Title V regulations.
See generally Amber Veverka, Regulators to Distill Public Comments on Bank-Privacy Rules,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 17761514 (paraphrasing Kellie
Cosgrove, FTC attorney in the financial practices division, as saying that "universities could be
included, if they let students use payment plans. Tax preparers, department stores that issue credit
cards, travel agencies and a long list of other businesses could have to play by the privacy
rule .... ).
158. See GLBA § 509(5).
159. § 509(6).
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nition of an entity as an affiliate or an unaffiliated third party turns on
whether the financial institution in fact "controls" the entity. 160
4. NONPUBLIC PERSONAL INFORMATION
Title V defines "nonpublic personal information" as personally
identifiable information that the consumer provides to a financial institu-
tion, results from a transaction with or service performed for the con-
sumer, or is otherwise obtained by the financial institution.'
6'
"Nonpublic personal information" does not include publicly available
information, including "any list, description or grouping of consumers
(and publicly available information pertaining to them) that is derived
without using any nonpublic personal information."1 62 However, the
definition does include "any list, description, or other grouping of con-
sumers (and publicly available information pertaining to them) that is
derived using any nonpublic personal information other than publicly
available information."'' 63 Thus, a financial institution may disclose
publicly available information, including information from a list,
description or grouping of customers that is derived using publicly avail-
able information.
a. The Scope of Nonpublic Personal Information
In defining the scope of "nonpublic personal information," the
FRB, FDIC, OCC and OTS, SEC, FTC and NCUA have adopted a two-
pronged approach. According to the agencies, "nonpublic personal
information" means "(i) [p]ersonally identifiable financial information;
and (ii) [a]ny list, description, or other grouping of consumers (and pub-
licly available information pertaining to them) that is derived using any
personally identifiable financial information that is not publicly availa-
ble."' 164  Information qualifies as "publicly available" if the financial
institution has a reasonable basis to believe that the information has been
lawfully made available to the general public from "(i) [f]ederal, [s]tate
160. See supra Section B(6).
161. See GLBA § 509(4).
162. § 509(4)(C)(ii).
163. § 509(4)(C)(i).
164. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40364 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35228 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332,
573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35219; FRS/FDIC:
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35208; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35199; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33681 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
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or local government records; (ii) [w]idely distributed media; or (iii)
[D]isclosures to the general public that are required to be made by
[f]ederal, [s]tate, or local law." '165
In general, a financial institution will satisfy the reasonableness
standard if it has taken steps to determine that the information is of a
type that is available to the general public and whether individuals can
order that the information remain unavailable to the general public and,
if so, that the consumer in question has failed to do so. 166 However, the
SEC's reasonableness standard takes a somewhat different route. Both
the SEC's and the other federal agencies' reasonableness standards
incorporate consumer information of a type that is available to the gen-
eral public. 167 Yet, according to the SEC's reasonableness standard, a
securities firm could not reasonably believe that it retains publicly avail-
able information if the information is of a type normally recorded with a
keeper of government records, such keeper is legally required to make
the information publicly available and the consumer has the legal ability
to keep the information nonpublic. 168  Thus, unlike the other federal
agencies, the SEC does not expressly require the consumer to actually
order that the information remain unavailable to the general public.
169
165. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216,332,
573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35219; FRS/FDIC:
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35199; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33681 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
166. FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35229 (June 1,
2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332, 573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35219; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65
Fed. Reg. at 35199; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, Fed. Reg. 33680 (May 24,
2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
167. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 284); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332,
573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35219; FRS/FDIC:
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35199; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33681 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
168. See SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248) (June
29, 2000).
169. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Alternatively, by ordering the federal agencies to issue a joint regulation,
Congress could have avoided this awkward situation.
Regardless of whether or not a financial institution actually
obtained the information from a source other than "government records,
widely distributed media, or government-mandated disclosures," all of
the federal agencies' definitions consider information "publicly availa-
ble" if a financial institution merely could obtain the information from
any of those three sources. 7 o If the information is lawfully available to
the general public, then it falls outside the definition of "nonpublic per-
sonal information."'' Therefore, even though a consumer provides the
financial institution with information, such action does not guarantee
that the information will receive protection as "nonpublic personal infor-
mation." In adopting such an expansive definition for "nonpublic per-
sonal information," the agencies have granted financial institutions the
freedom to share information from customer records, as long as the
information is legally available from a public source.' 72
b. Personally Identifiable Information
In Title V, Congress did not define what it meant by "personally
identifiable financial information," leaving the agencies with the unenvi-
able task of defining the term. In their final privacy rules, the FRB,
FDIC, OCC and OTS, SEC, FTC and NCUA have defined "personally
identifiable information" to encompass information falling into one of
three categories. The first category includes information that the con-
sumer provides the financial institution in order to obtain a financial
170. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332,
573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35219; FRS/FDIC:
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35199; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
171. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332,
573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35219; FRS/FDIC:
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35199; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
172. See id. Congressional Privacy Caucus, Comments on Proposed Rules Regarding Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information (Mar. 31, 2000) available at http://www.house.gov/markey/
cpfstat33100.htm. But see Heller, supra note 135.
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product or service. 173 The second category includes any information
that results from transactions to obtain financial services or products
between consumers and the financial institution. 174 The third category
includes any other information that a financial institution obtains from a
consumer resulting from a financial product or service transaction.
1 75
In general, however, "personally identifiable financial information"
does not include name and address lists of people who are customers of
a non-financial institution. 76 Thus, subject to Title V's notice and opt-
out procedure, financial institutions with access to such information may
generally share it with nonaffiliated third parties. 177  However, if a
financial institution includes such names and address lists as part of its
list of the institution's customers, then those names and addresses would
fall within the definition of "nonpublic personal information."'
' 78
173. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35228, 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216,
332, 573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35218; FRS/
FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35198; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
174. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35228, 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216,
332, 573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35218; FRS/
FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35198; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
175. See SEC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365 (June 29,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35228, 35229 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216,
332, 573); FRS/FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35218; FRS/
FDIC: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35209; FRS/FDIC: Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35198; FTC: Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, Fed. Reg. 33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA: Privacy
of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed Reg. 31742 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716, 741).
176. See id.
177. See infra Part IV. A.
178. See Joint Final Rule by Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35208 (June 1, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35218 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 65
C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 Fed. Reg. 35198, 35228-29
(proposed June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742
(May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741); SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40365
(June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
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5. DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR AGENCY EXAMPLES
The final rules of the Federal Banking Agencies, FTC and NCUA
provide financial institutions with examples of permissible activities; if
followed, these examples ensure the financial institutions that they are in
fact complying with the rule. 179 However, the examples accompanying
the SEC's proposed rules do not provide a similar safe harbor. °80 Thus,
even if a financial institution follows the SEC's examples, such action
does not guarantee that the financial institution has complied with the
rule.
6. OUT OF "CONTROL"
The SEC's definition of "control" differs from the definition pro-
vided by the Federal Banking Agencies, FTC and NCUA.' 8' As afore-
179. See Joint Final Rule by Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35208 (June 1, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35218 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 65
C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 Fed. Reg. 35198, 35228-29
(proposed June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
33680 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31742
(May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741).
180. See SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40363 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
248). The SEC's Final Rule states that:
The examples in this part and the sample clauses in the Appendix of this part
provide guidance concerning the rule's application in ordinary circumstances. The
facts and circumstances of each individual situation, however, will determine
whether compliance with an example or use of a sample clause, to the extent
applicable, constitutes compliance with this part.
Id.
181. The Federal Banking Agencies define "control" to mean:
(I) Ownership, control, or power to vote 25 percent or more of the outstanding
shares of any class of voting security of the company, directly or indirectly, or
acting through one or more other persons;
(2) Control in any manner over the election of a majority of the directors, trustees
or general partners (or individuals exercising similar functions) of the company; or
(3) The power to exercise, directly or indirectly, a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the company, as the [FRB, OCC, OTS or FDIC]
determines.
See Joint Final Rule by Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35207 (proposed Feb. 22, 2000); (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216)FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35218 (proposed Feb. 22, 2000); (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332) Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 Fed. Reg. 35197,
35228 (proposed Feb. 22, 2000); (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573). The FTC's version
differs from this definition only by deleting the phrase "as determined by..." in subsection (3).
See FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33679 (May 24, 2000); (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 313). The
NCUA's version differs from the Federal Banking Agencies' definition only in that, "with respect
to state-chartered credit unions, NCUA will consult with the appropriate state regulator prior to
making its [subsection (3)] determination." NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31741 (2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. 716 & 741) (proposed May 18, 2000). The SEC defines "control" to mean:
[Tlhe power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of
a company whether through ownership of securities, by contract, or otherwise. Any
person who owns beneficially, either directly or through one or more controlled
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mentioned, a company's status as an "affiliate" of a financial institution
depends on the definition of "control." Since the GLBA exempts finan-
cial institutions' affiliates from the Title V privacy requirements, an
agency's definition of "control" greatly affects the scope of a financial
institution's information-sharing capabilities. 18 2 Thus, since the Federal
Banking Agencies, FTC and NCUA, and the SEC define "control" dif-
ferently, a financial holding company that includes a bank, credit union,
FTC-regulated "financial institution" and a securities firm must apply
two standards for "control" when determining whether a company is a
Title V-exempted affiliate.
C. The Exceptions to Title V
Consumers cannot restrain a financial institution from sharing con-
sumers' private information with affiliates. As a result, consumers may
misinterpret Title V and think that it gives them comprehensive privacy
safeguards against information sharing between financial institutions
and nonaffiliated third parties. However, Title V includes several
implicit and explicit exceptions that weaken its general policy of protect-
ing the privacy of consumers' nonpublic personal information.
1. TITLE V COVERS NONAFFILIATED THIRD PARTIES, NOT AFFILIATES
First, Title V applies only to a financial institution's disclosures to
nonaffiliated third parties.183 Thus, a consumer's only real power under
Title V comes from monitoring and opting out of situations where finan-
cial institutions share consumers' private information with nonaffiliated
third parties. 184 However, a financial institution remains free to disclose
a consumer's nonpublic personal information to its direct affiliates or
subsidiaries without providing notice or an "opt out." '185
companies, more than 25 percent of the voting securities of any company is pre-
sumed to control the company. Any person who does not own 25 percent of the
voting securities of any company will be presumed not to control the company.
Any presumption regarding control may be rebutted by evidence, but in the case of
an investment company, will continue until the Commission makes a decision to the
contrary according to the procedures described in section 2(a)(9) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(9)).
See SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40364 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); see
also Letter from the Electronic Financial Services Council to the Federal Agencies (Mar. 31,
2000) available at http://www.efscouncil.org/frames/Recent%20Activities/FINALCOM.htm (urg-
ing the Agencies to adopt the SEC's definition of "control").
182. See GLBA § 502-503.
183. See id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 266 (discussing the requirements for a
financial institution's annual disclosure of its privacy policy).
184. See GLBA § 502(a)-(b).
185. See Fischer & Camper, supra note 6. Regarding information sharing among affiliates, the
GLBA only requires that the Secretary of the Treasury, in conjunction with the Secretary of the
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2. SERVICE PROVIDER/JOINT MARKETING EXCEPTION
Second, Title V does not apply when a financial institution dis-
closes consumers' nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third
parties "to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial
institution, including the financial institution's own products or services,
or financial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements
between two or more financial institutions. ... "I86 However, this ser-
vice provider/joint marketing exception only applies if (1) the financial
institution fully discloses to its customers that it provides such informa-
tion and (2) the financial institution and third party enter into a contract
requiring the third party to maintain the confidentiality of the informa-
tion. 8 7 Thus, a financial institution may entirely circumvent Title V by
entering into such contracts with third-party service providers.
88
3. COMBINING THE REUSE OF INFORMATION AND SERVICE PROVIDER!
JOINT MARKETING EXCEPTIONS
Third, if a financial institution lawfully could make a disclosure of
nonpublic personal information directly to nonaffiliated third parties of
either the financial institution or the receiving third party, then a nonaf-
filiated third party receiving nonpublic personal information from the
financial institution can also disclose the information to nonaffiliated
third parties of either the financial institution or the receiving third
party. 8 9 However, the service provider/joint marketing exception
allows financial institutions to lawfully transfer nonpublic personal
information to nonaffiliated third party service providers or joint market-
ers. Therefore, by combining the reuse of information and service pro-
vider/joint marketing exceptions, third party service providers or joint
marketers who receive such information from financial institutions could
then retransfer the information to other nonaffiliated third parties.' 90
Although one must meet the rather strict disclosure and contractual
requirements of the service provider/joint marketing exception, this
loophole, theoretically allowing nonaffiliated third parties to retransfer
Treasury and the federal functional regulators and after consulting representatives of state
insurance authorities, "shall conduct a study the information sharing practices of financial
institutions and their affiliates." See GLBA § 508(a). Then, on or before January 1, 2002, the
Secretary must submit to Congress a report concerning the study, including recommendations for
appropriate legislative or administrative action. § 508(c).
186. § 502(b)(2).
187. § 502(b)(2).
188. See Congressional Privacy Caucus, Comments on Proposed Rules Regarding Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, Mar. 31, 2000 available at http://www.house.gov/markey/
cpfstat33100.htm [hereinafter Congressional Privacy Caucus].
189. See GLBA § 502(c).
190. See supra note 189.
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information ad infinitum, completely subverts Title V's intentions. 191
4. CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCY EXCEPTION
Fourth, "a financial institution shall not disclose, other than to a
consumer reporting agency," a consumer's credit card, deposit or trans-
action account number or access number/code to nonaffiliated third par-
ties for the purpose of "telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other
marketing through electronic mail to the consumer."' 92 Thus, the GLBA
does seem to place limits on the type of information that financial insti-
tutions may disclose to nonaffiliated third parties under the exceptions.
However, a financial institution remains free to disclose this information
to a consumer reporting agency.
5. EIGHT SAFE HARBORS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Fifth, section 502(e) lists eight exceptions to the Title V disclosure
prohibitions.'93 Under these eight safe harbors, financial institutions
remain free to disclose a consumer's nonpublic personal information to
nonaffiliated third parties without providing the consumer with either
prior notice or an opportunity to opt out. 194 Together, these expansive
safe harbors establish the most gaping loophole in Title V's privacy
191. See id. But see Regulatory Advisory Services Practice of PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
Executive Overview and Summary of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Nov. 15, 1999, at 16
("Unaffiliated third parties cannot share information with other unaffiliated third parties of the
financial institution unless the financial institution could disclose that information to the other
unaffiliated third party directly.").
192. See GLBA § 502(d). See generally H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 266 (1999) ("The
Conferees agreed to exclude disclosures to consumer reporting agencies from section 502(d)'s
limitations on the sharing of account number information.").
193. § 502(e).
194. Under these eight safe harbors, financial institutions may disclose personal nonpublic
information (1) where a consumer requests or authorizes a transaction or in connection with (a)
servicing or processing a requested financial service or product; (b) maintaining or servicing the
consumer's account; or (c) proposed or actual securitizations, secondary market sales or similar
transactions related to a consumer's transaction; (2) with the consumer's consent; (3)(a) to protect
the confidentiality and security of the financial institution's records concerning the customer,
service, product or transaction; (b) to prevent or protect against "actual or potential fraud,
unauthorized transactions, claims, or other liability"; (c) for the institution's required risk control
or to resolve customer inquiries or disputes; (d) to legal or beneficial interest-holders relating to
the consumer; (e) to a consumer's fiduciaries; (4) to insurance rate advisory organizations,
guaranty funds or agencies, rating agencies, persons who assess whether the institution is
complying with industry standards and the financial institution's attorneys, accountants and
auditors; (5) to law enforcement agencies, self-regulatory organizations, or for investigations
relating to public safety matters; (6)(a) to a consumer reporting agency as required by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act or (b) from a consumer report provided by a consumer reporting agency; (7)
in connection with proposed or actual sales, mergers, transfers, or exchanges of all or portions of a
business or operating unit; and (8) in compliance with Federal, State or local legal requirements.
See GLBA § 502(e).
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provisions. 195
6. AGENCY AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS
Sixth, the agencies and authorities prescribing the privacy regula-
tions are free to include any additional disclosure exceptions that are
consistent with Title V.19 6 In fact, the federal regulators may allow
financial institutions to disclose "customer account numbers, or similar
forms of access numbers or access codes in an encrypted, scrambled, or
similarly coded form," where (1) the customer expressly authorizes the
disclosure and (2) the disclosure is necessary for the financial institution
to service or process a customer-requested or -authorized transaction. 97
195. See Congressional Privacy Caucus supra note 188, (discussing the need for language
limiting the amount or type of information disclosed under the exceptions and clarifying what
constitutes consumer "consent"); Letter from the Electronic Financial Services Counsel to the
Federal Agencies, Mar. 31, 2000 available at http://www.efscouncil.org/frames/
Recent%20Activities/FINALCOM.htm (requesting the Agencies to institute a reasonableness
standard for consent).
196. See GLBA § 504(b); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 266 (1999) ("The
Conferees agreed to give the relevant regulatory agencies the authority to prescribe exceptions to
subsections (a) through (d) of section 502, rather than just sections 502 (a) and (b), as provided for
in the House bill."). Significantly, Congress "wish[ed] to ensure that smaller financial institutions
are not placed at a competitive disadvantage by a statutory regime that permits certain information
to be shared freely within an affiliate structure while limiting the ability to share that same
information with nonaffiliated third parties." H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 267 (1999). Thus, in
prescribing their privacy regulations, the agencies and authorities "should take into consideration
any adverse competitive effects upon small commercial banks, thrifts and credit unions." Id.
Thus, the agencies and authorities could exclude smaller financial institutions from Title V's
disclosure and opt out mechanism. However, the banking agencies have not taken active steps to
allow such exclusion. See Joint Final Rule by Federal Reserve Board, 65 Fed. Reg. 35191
(proposed Feb. 22, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35192 (June 1,
2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332); Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 Fed.
Reg. 35189, 35194-95 (proposed Feb. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573).
197. H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 267 (1999); see also Robert MacMillan, Financial Services
Ready for President Clinton, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1999 (stating that although "telemarketers may
not use bank account information for marketing purposes, . . in some circumstances they can,
provided that account data is encrypted and various other requests are met"). According to the
federal agencies' final rules:
You must not, directly or through an affiliate, disclose, other than to a consumer
reporting agency, an account number or similar form of access number or access
code for a consumer's credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account to
any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other
marketing through electronic mail to the consumer . . . An account number, or
similar form of access number or access code, does not include a number or code in
encrypted form, as long as [the financial institutions] do not provide the recipient
with a means to decode the number or code.
Joint Final Rule by Federal Reserve System, 65 Fed. Reg. 35214 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 216); FDIC, 65 Fed. Reg. 35224 (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332);
Department of the Treasury (OCC and OTS), 65 Fed. Reg. 35204, 35234 (June 1, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40 & 573); FTC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33686 (May 24, 2000) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313); NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31747 (proposed May 18, 2000) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741); SEC Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 40370 (June 29, 2000) (to
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Thus, although contingent on obtaining consumer authorization, the fed-
eral regulators could exclude encrypted information from the scope of
Title V.
D. The Future of Federal Financial Privacy Law
In terms of federal financial privacy law, the GLBA is not the end
of the story. Even though the GLBA is barely one year old, several
legislators have already mounted an effort to enact a tougher law that
would give consumers the right to opt-in to information sharing between
financial institutions and their affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties.
Additionally, President Clinton has mounted his own campaign to enact
a more customer-friendly financial privacy act. Thus, as the financial
services industry awaits the success or failure of these initiatives, the
fate of the GLBA hangs in the balance.
1. THE CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT
In response to what they saw as the GLBA's insufficient and unac-
ceptable privacy protections, Representatives Edward J. Markey (D-
MA) and Joe Barton (R-TX), and Senators Richard Shelby (R-AL) and
Richard Bryan (D-NV) have introduced the Consumer's Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act.' 98 The legislation would give consumers the right to
"opt-in" to information sharing between a financial institution and both
its affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties.' 99 Under this opt-in proce-
dure, a financial institution must obtain the consumers' permission
before sharing their nonpublic personal information. 2" Therefore, if the
consumers object or fail to respond, the financial institution cannot dis-
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248). But see Veverka, supra note 10 (summarizing the Federal
banking agencies' joint proposed privacy rules).
198. See H.R. 3320, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1903, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Congressional
Privacy Caucus, supra note 188 (discussing the Right to Financial Privacy Act's strong financial
privacy protections); Schroeder, supra note 16 (discussing the Senators' intent to introduce
tougher privacy legislation). Even the President is calling for extended privacy protections. See
generally President's Statement on Signing Legislation To Reform the Financial System, 35
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2363 (Nov. 12, 1999) available at 1999 WL 24368375M2 ("Although
[GLBA's privacy restrictions] are significant steps forward, we will continue to press for even
greater privacy protections - especially choice about whether personal financial information can
be shared within a corporate family."); Megan Ptacek, N. Y. Lawmakers Weigh Tougher Privacy
Strictures, AM. BANKER, Mar. 22, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 3360401 ("Peter P. Swire, the
administration's chief counselor for privacy, said President Clinton would propose legislation in
'the coming weeks' that would require financial institutions to give customers the chance to block
or 'opt out,' of data sharing to affiliates.")
199. See H.R. 3320, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1903, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Congressional
Privacy Caucus Slams Draft Privacy Regulations, I Apr. 3, 2000, at http://www.senate.gov/
~bryan/press/00/04/2000403AO6.html (discussing the Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy
Act).
200. See Congressional Privacy Caucus, supra note 188.
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close their information.2°'
2. THE FINANCIAL INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
At his commencement address to Eastern Michigan State Univer-
sity, President Clinton outlined a new legislative proposal that would
augment the GLBA's safeguards, and further enhance consumers' finan-
202cial privacy. Incorporating President Clinton's proposal, Representa-
tive John LaFalce (D-NY) sponsored the Financial Information Privacy
Protection Act 2°3 in the House of Representatives. Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) introduced a companion bill in the Senate. 2°
Under the Financial Information Privacy Protection Act, consumers
would have the right to choose whether a financial institution can share
financial information with affiliates or third parties. 20 5 Thus, the Clinton
proposal extends the reach of the GLBA by expanding the opt-out right
201. See id. The Congressional Privacy Caucus claims that the opt-in mechanism is the norm
in many other areas of law:
[A] consumer "opt in" is required before a tax preparer could transfer information
from a consumer's tax return to a financial advisory affiliate to provide the
consumer with financial planning advice. An "opt-in" is required before a video
rental store can provide information regarding a consumer's videocassette rentals to
others. "Opt in" is required before telephone companies can transfer information
about what telephone numbers a consumer calls or the whereabouts of the cellular
phone the consumer is using to other parties. "Opt in" is required before cable
television companies can provide information about what pay per view movies a
consumer is watching to other parties.
Id. But see Brian Krebs, Advocates, Banks Spar Over Proposed Privacy Regs, NEWSBYTES, Apr.
3, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2275580 (discussing the problems with an opt-in mechanism);
Dean Anason, Privacy Battle Volleys Will Fly In Bellweather New York State, AM. BANKER, Mar.
21, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 3360373 (same).
202. See A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, The Clinton-Gore
Plan to Enhance Consumers' Financial Privacy: Protecting Core Values in the Information Age
1-2, May 1, 2000 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/20000501_4.html.
203. H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Anason, supra note 18 (quoting Rep. John J.
LaFalce, D-N.Y., as stating that "[tihe original bill was only the first step .... We want to build
on that and we are committed to finishing the job."); Dean Anason, Capital Briefs: Clinton
Privacy Bill To Be Offered in Congress, AM. BANKER, May 4, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL
3361353 (discussing the House bill); Len Famiglietti, Congress Introduces New Financial Privacy
Legislation, BEST'S INSURANCE NEWS, May 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4085985 (same); Glen
Simpson, U.S. Legislation Would Aid Privacy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 5, 2000, at 24, available
at 2000 WL-WSJA 2939272 (same).
204. S. 2513, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Anason, supra note 203 (discussing the Senate
bill); Simpson, supra note 203 (same).
205. See H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000); S. 2513, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000); A Proclamation
by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202; see also Famiglietti, supra note
203 (summarizing the President's proposal); Brian Krebs, Clinton Proposes Long Awaited
Financial Privacy Regs, NEWSBYTES, May 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2276675 (stating that
the President developed his plan in tandem with the Treasury Department and the Office of
Management and Budget).
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to include affiliates as well as nonaffiliated third parties. 206 A financial
institution would also need to obtain a consumer's consent (i.e., the con-
sumer would need to "opt-in") before it could gain medical information
from its affiliates or share detailed information regarding a consumer's
particular spending habits. 2 7  Therefore, the House and Senate Bills
eliminate the GLBA's "joint marketing" exception, by restricting an
affiliate's or nonaffiliated third party's ability to redisclose and reuse a
consumer's nonpublic personal information.2"8 Additionally, consumers
would have a right to review their information and to correct material
errors. 20 9 Finally, upon a consumer's application or request, a financial
institution would need to provide its privacy notices.210 As a result, con-
sumers would have the resources necessary to "comparison shop" for
financial institutions' privacy policies before establishing a customer
relationship with a financial institution.21'
206. See A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202.
207. See H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2000); S. 2513, 106th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2000); A
Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202. But see, e.g.,
Krebs, supra note 205 (quoting Fred Cate, professor of business law at Indiana University, as
calling the Clinton opt-in proposal "disastrous:" "When a customer defaults on an insurance
policy or walks out on a loan, does that mean the insurance company can't check with their
affiliate banks to find out if that person has an account with them, or vice versa?"); but see
Famiglietti, supra note 203 (discussing the Representatives' reactions in the House to the
President's proposal).
208. See H.R. 4830, 106th Cong. § 5 (2000); S. 2513, 106th Cong. § 5 (2000); A Proclamation
by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202. Section 5 of both Bills would
amend section 502 of the GLBA by (1) renumbering subsections (d) and (e) as (e) and (f),
respectively and (2) inserting the following new subsection (d):
(d) LIMITS ON REDISCLOSURE AND REUSE OF INFORMATION -
(1) IN GENERAL - An affiliate or a nonaffiliated third party that receives
nonpublic personal information from a financial institution shall not disclose such
information to any other person unless such disclosure would be lawful if made
directly to such other person by the financial institution.
(2) DISCLOSURE UNDER A GENERAL EXCEPTION - Notwithstanding
paragraph (1), any person that receives nonpublic personal information from a
financial institution in accordance with one of the general exceptions in subsection
(f) may use or disclose such information only -
(A) as permitted under that general exception; or
(B) under another general exception in subsection (f), if necessary to carry out the
purpose for which the information was disclosed by the financial institution.
H.R. 4830, 106th Cong. § 5 (2000); S. 2513, 106th Cong. § 5 (2000).
209. See H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. § 6 (2000); S. 2513, 106th Cong. § 6 (2000); A Proclamation
by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202.
210. See H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. § 8 (2000); S. 2513, 106th Cong. § 8 (2000); A Proclamation
by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202.
211. See A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, supra note 202; see
also Anason, supra note 18 (predicting that Federal regulators will provide model disclosure
statements to aid financial institutions in drafting their privacy notices). But see, e.g., Krebs,
supra note 205 (quoting Professor Fred Cate as saying that "the administration's proposal will
likely cause consumers to pour through an average of 50 pieces of lengthy privacy disclosure
20011
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The changes outlined in the Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy
Act and the Financial Information Privacy Protection Act would benefit
the GLBA, but one cannot help but question the wisdom of amending
the GLBA during its critical infancy.212 Although the Acts, both decid-
edly pro-consumer, make great strides in safeguarding the privacy of
consumers' financial information, the Representatives, Senators and the
President are acting without the benefit of hindsight as to how the
GLBA will affect and/or protect consumers within the financial services
industry. 1 3 By witnessing the effects of the GLBA in practice as
opposed to theory, the Representatives, Senators and the President could
more precisely adjust their respective Acts to compensate for the
GLBA's weaknesses.
E. The Federal Standard Versus State Law
Under section 507 of the GLBA, if a state statute, regulation, order
or interpretation is inconsistent with the provisions in Title V, then Title
V will supersede the state law, but only to the extent of the inconsis-
tency. 14 However, a state law that provides greater privacy protection
is not inconsistent with Title V; thus, Title V will not preempt tougher
state privacy laws.2"5 Therefore, the GLBA's privacy provisions
represent a floor, not a ceiling. States can adopt stronger privacy rules
that will effectively override the federal agencies' privacy regulations
enacted pursuant to Title V.
211
mailings each year from financial companies intent on sharing their information with third
parties").
212. See Famiglietti, supra note 203.
213. See Barnett, supra note 5 (quoting Bob Davis of America's Community Bankers as
stating that "it's not obvious to me that the regulations being drafted are not going to adequately
address the problems . . . . [Why] put blanket over blanket before even getting in bed?");
Famiglietti, supra note 203 (quoting Senator Phil Gramm as stating that "the rules to put
[GLBA's] protections in place are still being written by regulators. . . . We need to give
customers and their financial institutions time to absorb those new rules before we consider
changing them."); Robert MacMillan, Privacy Develops Into Public Issue In Congress,
NEWSBYTES, May 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21177175 (discussing the efforts of senators
and Congress members to enact tougher privacy legislation); Krebs, supra note 205 (quoting
Professor Cate as stating that "it took them 18 years to get to this point, and we're not even six
months out but already the Clinton administration wants to change it").
214. See GLBA, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 507(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1442 (2000).
215. See §§ 507(a), (b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 266 (1999). The FTC, after
consulting with the applicable agency or authority, shall determine whether GLBA supersedes
State privacy law.
216. One should note that:
A banking regulator is not required to provide confidential information to a State
insurance regulator unless such State regulator agrees to keep the information in
confidence and make all reasonable efforts to oppose disclosure of such
information. Conversely, Federal banking regulators are directed to treat as
confidential any information received from a State regulator which is entitled to
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1. THE CALL FOR TOUGHER STATE PRIVACY LAWS
Before Congress enacted the GLBA's privacy provisions, they
stirred a firestorm of controversy. Although some believed that the pri-
vacy provisions went too far, others believed that they did not go far
enough.2" 7 In addition to the exceptions listed in previously, the
GLBA's privacy provisions will also result in interpretive entangle-
ments, as financial holding companies try to reconcile the subtle differ-
ences between the federal agencies' privacy regulations. In addition, the
possibility of fifty-one different state privacy laws presents a potential
regulatory nightmare for any bank or financial holding company with
interstate operations.2' 8 Consequently, banks with branches in multiple
states might have to contend with separate and inconsistent privacy
laws.2 19 Significantly, states are already gearing up to enact privacy
confidential treatment under State law, and to make similar reasonable efforts to
oppose disclosure of the information.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 261-62 (1999). Thus, if a State law provides greater confidential
treatment to such information, the Federal regulators must abide by the tougher State standard.
Interestingly, the reverse-preemption language of Section 507 mirrors the preemption standard for
the insurance customer protections found in FDIA Section 47(g); as aforementioned, GLBA Sec-
tion 305 added Section 47 to the FDIA. See GLBA, § 305; Part III. Thus, a State may enact both
insurance customer protection and privacy regulations that offer greater protection than GLBA
without fear of preemption.
217. See Congressional Privacy Caucus, supra note 188 (discussing the Caucus' problems with
the Agencies' privacy regulations).
218. See Zolkos, supra note 21 ("In the worst-case scenario, companies and agencies could
face a regulatory nightmare of 51 different sets of conflicting privacy laws,")
219. Thus far, California and New York are considering privacy bills with a stricter opt-in
mechanism for financial institutions' information sharing. See Ren Wijnen, Privacy Matters in
the Digital Age, BANK TECH. NEWS, Apr. 3, 2000, available at 2000 WL 17153362. As of May,
2000, Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, the
Virgin Islands, Wisconsin and Washington have passed Right to Financial Privacy Acts. See ALA.
CODE § 5-5A-43 (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.175 (Michie 1998); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7460-
7493 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-41-36a-45 (West 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-
340(3)(d) (Michie 1998); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/48.1 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289-
271 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.333 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B,
§§ 162-163 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN. §§1-301-305 (Michie 1998 and Supp. 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13A.01-13A.04, 5IA.l (West 1997 and Supp. 2000); MIss.CODE ANN. §§ 81-12-
77, 81-5-55 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 408.675-408.700 (West 1990 and Supp. 2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-8-501-32-8-524 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1401 (1997); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 239A.010-239A.190 (Michie 1996 and Supp. 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 359-C:1-359-C:18 (1995 and Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16K-3 (West 1984); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-7-1, 14-7-2 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-B-1-53B-10 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 6-08.1-01-6-08.1-08 (1987 and Supp. 1999); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2201-
2208 (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.550-192.595 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-28-410; 34-
36-50 (West 1999); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-10-103; 45-10-112--45-10-118 (1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-45-78-27-50.5 (1996 and Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1024 (1999); V.1 CODE
ANN. § 6 (1998) T.l 244; WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 9.35.001-9.35.902 (West 2000); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 215.26 (West 1994 and Supp. 1999); see also supra note 4. California, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
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laws tougher than Title V.220
2. THE STATE INSURANCE REGULATORS, NAIC AND PRIVACY -
Too MANY COOKS SPOIL THE BROTH
NAIC is moving forward in its effort to develop a uniform national
privacy standard for the insurance industry. Signed by forty-eight state
insurance commissioners, NAIC members have approved, in light of the
GLBA, a new blueprint for state insurance regulation. 22' This blueprint
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin have passed laws that prohibit recording
credit card numbers on checks. See CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1725 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 914-915 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.075 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-393.3
(1994); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-505A (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.8101 (West 2000); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-669 (1994); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW II § 13-318 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 93, § 105 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2964 (West 1999); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325F.981 (West 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.940 (Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 358-M:1 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-21 (West 2000); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 520-a
(West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-14.1-03 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.17, 1349.99
(West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.892 (1998); 69 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 1994);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-15 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-22-104 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § II-
33.1, 11-34 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.3-512 (West 1995); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 423.402 (West 1998). Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia have passed laws limiting the uses of
customer information in insurance transactions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-66-607 (Michie
1999); 215 I11. COMP. STAT 5/1001-1024 (1993 and Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
99 22:3063; 6:333 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2201-2220 (West 2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.1243 (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406-C:9 (1998);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-12-10 (Michie 1999); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 716.610(g) (1998); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-58-1-13 (1999); TEX. CODE ANN. ch. 21, art. 21.48A (West 1988); W. VA.
ACTS ch. 47. Colorado, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Rhode Island have passed laws limiting
the use of social security numbers. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-109.5 (West 1999);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2964 (West 1999); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 518-a (West 1996);
OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1349.17, 1349.99 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-15 (Lexis
1999). Minnesota and Montana have included financial privacy provisions in their respective
Electronic Funds Transfer Acts. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.69 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 32-6-105 (1999). Hawaii, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming are the only States without
such laws. See generally, 17 No. 14 Banking Pol'y Rep. 5, supra note 4 (summarizing an
American Bankers Association article on the scope of U.S. banks' consumer privacy protections
and listing the various States' privacy laws).
220. See ABA Paper, supra note 4, at 5; see also Heller, supra note 144 (discussing two
California privacy bills that include opt-in mechanisms); Zolkos, supra note 23 (stating that
Arizona, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Washington are considering "opt-in" bills and
last year, Montana enacted such a law). But see State Regulation: Iowa: High Road in Its Bill,
INS. ACCT. Apr. 3, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8650023 (stating that "the Iowa legislature has
passed a financial privacy bill that won't exceed the standards set by federal regulators").
221. See NAIC Approves Blueprint for Future of Insurance Regulation, PR Newswire, Mar.
13, 2000, at 1. Insurance regulators from Arizona and Hawaii have not signed the Blueprint. See
Theresa Miller, NAIC Commissioners Overwhelmingly Approve State Regulation Revamp, BEST
WIRE, Mar. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4085198. Hawaii was not represented at the meeting;
Arizona Commissioner Charles Cohen has said that Arizona will likely sign it. See id. However,
NAIC's historically slow pace in considering issues and reforms could doom its efforts to develop
a uniform system. See Full Speed Ahead On Reform, Bus. INS, Mar. 27, 2000, at 8, available at
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provides the states with a skeletal outline to follow when enacting more
detailed privacy protections. The NAIC states that by "[w]orking with
our governors and state legislatures, we will undertake a thorough
review of our respective state laws to determine needed regulatory or
statutory changes to achieve functional regulation as contemplated by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act."2"2 To facilitate such action, NAIC's
Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Model Act supplies the
states with a working template. 23
Thus far, seventeen states have enacted some form of the almost-
twenty-year-old Model Act. 224 Similar in certain respects to the GLBA,
the Model Act requires insurance firms to (1) provide consumers with
notice of their information-sharing practices and (2) allow consumers
the opportunity to opt out before sharing personal information in con-
nection with marketing products or services.2 25  Like the GLBA, the
Model Act also carves out exceptions enabling insurance firms to dis-
close consumers' personal information.
26
2000 WL 8170840 (discussing state insurance regulators' efforts to overhaul State insurance
regulations).
222. NAIC Approves Blueprint for Future of Insurance Regulation, supra, note 221, at 2.
223. See, e.g., James M. Cain, et al., The Cost of Sharing: Prepare for New Federal and State
Restrictions on Consumer Financial Data, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at 26. NAIC has also
created a privacy working group to help states to implement GLBA's provisions. See id.
224. See NAIC Insurance Information and Privacy Model Act (1980) available at 1999 WL
NAIC 670-1. As of October, 1999, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Virginia and Wyoming have adopted the model act. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-
2101-202120 (West 1981); CAL. INS. CODE § 791.01-791-26 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38a-975 -38a-998 (West 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-39-1-33-39-23 (1985); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431:17-101--431:17-106 (West 1988); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1001-5/
1024 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2,111--40-2,113 (1986) (adopting part of model);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 2201-2220 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1751
§§ 1-22 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72A.49-72A.505 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-19-101-33-19-409 (1999); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 679B.560-679B.750 (1997); N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 17:23A-l-17:23A-22 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-39-1-58-39-120 (1981);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3904.1-3904.22 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 746.600-746.690 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-600-38.2-620 (Michie 1987); WYO. INs.
REGS. Ch. 25 (1989); see also NAIC Insurance Information and Privacy Model Act (1980), supra
note 221 (listing the states that have adopted the model act).
225. See NAIC Insurance Information and Privacy Model Act, supra note 221, at 6-8. The
Model Act defines "personal information" as "any individually identifiable information gathered
in connection with an insurance transaction from which judgments can be made about an
individual's character, habits, avocations, finances, occupation, general reputation, credit, health
or any other personal characteristics." Id. at 5. Thus, the Model Act's definition of "personal
information" covers more ground than the Federal agencies' definition of "publicly available
information." Significantly, the Model Act prohibits insurance firms from sharing for marketing
purposes information that relates to a consumer's "character, personal habits, mode of living or
general reputation." See Cain, et al., supra note 223, at 26 (discussing the NAIC Model Act);
NAIC Insurance Information and Privacy Model Act, supra note 221, at 15.
226. See NAIC Insurance Information and Privacy Model Act, supra note 224, at 14-16.
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:163
Although the NAIC Blueprint and the Model Act represent noble
efforts toward a uniform privacy standard for the insurance industry,
already twenty states have their own separate privacy bills pending in
their respective legislatures.22 7 Thus, as the states continue to compete
individually with the federal agencies' rulemaking efforts, financial
holding companies are left with the task of deciphering not only the
federal agencies' already puzzling array of privacy regulations, but also
the states' individual insurance privacy standards.
3. LIMITATIONS ON STATES' ABILITY TO ENACT TOUGHER
PRIVACY LAWS
In theory, the states can enact tougher privacy laws without fear of
preemption under the GLBA. In reality, however, two potential barriers
could defeat such efforts. The federal preemption mechanism found in
section 104 of the GLBA and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
2 18
("FCRA") have chilling effects on state laws that attempt to exceed the
Title V boundaries.
a. Section 104
First, the GLBA empowers state insurance regulators to enforce
Title V and its prescribed regulations "[u]nder state insurance law, in the
case of any person engaged in providing insurance, by the applicable
state insurance authority of the state in which the person is domiciled,
Significantly, the Model Act limits the way that an insurance company's affiliate may use such
information. See id. at 15 (stating that an affiliate may only use such information "in connection
with an audit of the insurance institution or agent or marketing of an insurance product or service,
provided the affiliate agrees not to disclose the information for any other purpose or to unaffiliated
persons ...").
227. Pending bills in California, Massachusetts and New Jersey would ban discrimination
against consumers who do not permit sharing of their financial information. See Rodd Zolkos,
Insurers Seek Uniform Privacy Guidelines: Trade Groups Voice Concern over Varied State
Rulemaking Efforts, Bus. INs., Mar. 20, 2000, at 20F, available at 2000 WL 8170652.
Washington is considering a bill to restrict information collection. And Montana passed a similar
measure last year. See id. California, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah and Washington are considering measures to criminalize efforts to get
personal financial information for criminal or fraudulent purposes. See id.; see also Theresa
Miller, Trade Groups Suggest Following Federal Privacy Guidelines, BEST WIRE, Mar. 13, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 4085194 (paraphrasing NAIC Vice President Kathleen Sebelius); see also
Anason, supra note 203, at I ("If New York were to legislate additional privacy restrictions, it
could very likely contribute to an inconsistent patchwork of conflicting legislation across State
boarders ...."); Anason, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing Minnesota's tougher "opt in" proposed
privacy legislation); Miller, supra note 24 (stating that Vermont's proposed bill "would allow
companies to share or transfer information among company employees or agents, or affiliated
companies, only while servicing a customer's account."). But see Heller, supra note 26 at 2,
(stating that New York probably will not pass an encompassing consumer privacy law this year).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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subject to section 104 of [the] Act. '2 2 9 Thus, if the states choose to
enact privacy legislation equivalent to, if not greater than, Title V, then
section 504 empowers the state insurance authorities to enforce those
state laws without fear of federal preemption. 230  However, the state
insurance authorities' enforcement power is made subject to the section
104 preemption rules.
Therefore, in enacting privacy laws for persons engaged in the
insurance business, states cannot prevent or restrict a depository institu-
tion or its affiliates from (1) affiliating or associating with any person
authorized by the GLBA or any other federal law or (2) engaging
directly or indirectly in any activities authorized by the GLBA. Argua-
bly, a financial institution could claim that a state's privacy laws violate
section 104, necessitating federal preemption, because the given regula-
tions prevent or restrict its right to affiliate, associate or engage in allow-
able activities under the GLBA. Thus, although the GLBA facially
allows states to enact tougher privacy laws, this freedom is severely
restricted by section 104.231
b. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Second, the FCRA232 prohibits states from enacting laws that pre-
vent or restrict information sharing among affiliates. The FCRA gov-
erns the uses of credit information.233 More specifically, the Act
"governs the information practices of consumer reporting agencies, such
as credit bureaus, and the use of consumer reports and the sharing of
affiliate information by financial institution holding companies and
other multicompany organizations. 234 To evaluate its customers' char-
acter, reputation, credit worthiness, credit standing and credit capacity,
banks depend on fair and accurate credit reporting.2 35 As such, inaccu-
229. See GLBA §505(a)(6); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 261 (1999) ("In general,
Subtitle A of Title III reaffirms that States are the regulators for the insurance activities for all
persons, including acting as the functional regulator for the insurance activities of Federally
chartered banks. This functional regulatory power is subject to section 104 of Title I, however,
which sets forth the appropriate balance of protections against discriminatory actions.").
230. See GLBA § 504.
231. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New Federal Preemption Rules Concerning
Insurance and Other Affiliations of Depository Institutions: Section 104 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Nov. 30, 1999, at 5, at http://www.gdl-w.com/publications/up_ds ("[Section 104]
does not define or characterize discrimination that might invalidate otherwise protected State
action. This broad language suggests that any State rule or action concerning a proposed
affiliation with a depository institution that has a discriminatory effect, even if unintended, on a
depository organization may be found preempted.")
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
233. § 1481(b); see also, ABA Paper supra note 4, at 6 (discussing the FCRA).
234. ABA Paper, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing the FCRA).
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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rate and unfair credit reporting impairs the efficiency of, and under-
mines, public confidence in the banking system.
23 6
Based on this reasoning, Congress enacted the FCRA which
requires consumer reporting agencies to adopt reasonable procedures
that would (1) meet commerce's need for consumer credit, personnel,
insurance and other information and (2) be fair and equitable to the con-
sumer.237 To further its goal of fair and accurate credit reporting, Con-
gress declared that "no requirement or prohibition may be imposed
under the laws of any state ... with respect to the exchange of informa-
tion among persons affiliated by common ownership or common corpo-
rate control .... 238 So far, Susan Henrichsen, California's Deputy
Attorney General, has argued that if shared information is not a "con-
sumer report or application," then such information-sharing between
affiliates is not governed by the FCRA's preemption provision.239 Thus,
theoretically, GLBA section 507 would trump the FCRA. However, the
FCRA's preemption provision covers information-sharing among affili-
ates without specifically limiting the information's scope to "consumer
reports. ' 24 ° Therefore, the FCRA's preemption provision trumps any
state law that will prevent or restrict information exchanges between
affiliates.24'
236. See id.
237. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) Under the FCRA, a "consumer reporting agency" is
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681(f).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1481(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
239. See Heller, supra note 26 (discussing the California Deputy Attorney General's
contention). One should note that the preemption provision in the FCRA expires after January 1,
2004. See id.
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(t); see also Heller, supra note 26 (discussing contentions that the
FCRA's preemption provision is not limited to "consumer reports"). See generally Richard
Fischer & Clarke Dryden Camper, Fair Credit Reporting Act Remains Potent, AM. BANKER, Dec.
17, 1999, at 10, available at 1999 WL 21145726 (declaring that the FCRA continues to govern
information-sharing between affiliated parties, its authority remaining unaffected by GLBA's
privacy title); Eileen Canning & Marc Selinger, Financial Services: New Powers for Financial
Holding Companies Present 'Two-Edged Sword,' Fed Official Says, BNA BANKING DAILY, Jan.
21, 2000, at d3 (discussing how the FCRA could deter states' tougher privacy provisions); Robert
O'Harrow Jr., A Postscript on Privacy; Bank Bill's Late Change Gives States Last Word, WASH.
POST Nov. 5, 1999, at E9, available at 1999 WL 23313091 (same).
241. In its regulatory analysis of its proposed privacy regulations, the OCC states that, under
the FCRA, financial institutions must provide consumers with the ability to opt out of the financial
institutions' information sharing with their affiliates. According to the OCC, the financial
institution must provide an opt out when (1) the financial institution shares certain consumer
information with affiliates; and (2) does not want to be treated as a consumer reporting agency.
See Joint Final Rule by Department of the Treasury (OCC), Regulatory Analysis, 65 Fed. Reg.
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35189, (June 1, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332, 573). After reading the
express language in the FCRA, however, one concludes that the OCC's position is, at best, an
overstatement.
Under the FCRA,
a consumer may elect to have the consumer's name and address excluded from any
list provided by a consumer reporting agency under subsection (c)(1)(B) of this
section in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by
the consumer, by notifying the agency in accordance with paragraph (2) that the
consumer does not consent to any use of a consumer report relating to the consumer
in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the
consumer.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). This opt out mechanism involves situations where a
consumer reporting agency provides consumer reports
[t]o a person which it has reason to believe - (A) intends to use the information in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer ... and involving the
extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or...
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance
involving the consumer;
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) & (C) (Supp. IV 1998).
However, within the ambit of these situations, a consumer may have his name and address
excluded from a consumer reporting agency's list in relation to any credit or insurance transaction
where the consumer has not initiated the transaction only if (1) the transaction consists of a firm
offer of credit or insurance; (2) the consumer reporting agency complies with subsection (e); and
(3) the consumer has not elected under subsection (e) to have his or her name and address
excluded from the consumer reporting agency's list of names. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(l)(B)(i-
iii) (Supp. IV 1998). Therefore, the opt out is limited to (1) information consisting of a con-
sumer's name and address; (2) situations involving consumer credit transactions where there
exists a firm offer of credit or insurance. See Cain, et al., supra note 223 (stating that Title V will
not preempt tougher State privacy laws, "at least as far as they concern information sharing with
nonaffiliated third parties."). "Under GLB, State laws may provide for greater privacy protections
with respect to information sharing among nonaffiliated third parties. State laws will not, how-
ever, override the FCRA's rules governing information sharing among affiliates." Id. (Emphasis
in original). See generally Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, New Federal Privacy Requirements
Affecting Any Company Engaged in "Financial" Business, Jan. 15, 2000 at http://gd-l-w.com/
publications/814200093347.privacy.asp ("The Act calls for the Federal banking agencies to adopt
rules under the FCRA, but does not supersede the FCRA provisions permitting affiliate informa-
tion sharing."); Regulatory Advisory Services Practice of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Executive
Overview and Summary of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Nov. 15, 1999, at 16 (on file with author)
("a clause in the Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits States from legislating in the area of informa-
tion sharing among affiliates."). But see Donna Tanoue, Chairman of the FDIC, Remarks at a
Public Forum Hosted by the FDIC: "Is It Any of Your Business? Consumer Information, Privacy,
and the Financial Services Industry 2 (March 23, 2000) at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
speeches/chairman/sp23Mar00.htm ("The banking regulators are also drafting a proposed Fair
Credit Reporting Act regulation regarding certain information sharing with affiliates, which would
also allow consumers to opt out of information sharing."); but see also Congressional Privacy
Caucus, supra note 188 (reiterating that GLBA does not preempt State laws providing greater
privacy protection). By guaranteeing that tougher state privacy laws survived preemption, those
Congressional Privacy Caucus members who served as Conferees on GLBA intended to give
states the freedom to
adopt stronger privacy protections, including ... laws giving consumers the ability
to 'opt-in' to both affiliate and nonaffiliated third party disclosures of nonpublic
personal information, stronger State laws regarding medical privacy, or any other
additional protections which the States deemed necessary in addition to the 'floor'
of protections provided under Federal law.
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As aforementioned, Title V will not preempt state privacy law as
long as such laws are not inconsistent with the Title V provisions. State
laws that are tougher than the Title V provisions are not inconsistent.
Therefore, Title V will not supersede tougher state privacy laws. How-
ever, subject to two unrelated amendments to the FCRA, the GLBA
declares that nothing in Title V modifies, supersedes or limits the
FCRA.242 Significantly, the Conference Report expressly states that
"disclosure of nonpublic personal information contained in a consumer
report reported by a consumer reporting agency does not fall within sec-
tion 502's notice and opt out requirements." '243 Therefore, states cannot
enact privacy laws that prevent or restrict such information exchanges
between financial institutions and their affiliates. Such state action
would derogate the FCRA.244 Although such laws would be tougher
than Title V, they would effectively supersede the FCRA and violate
Title V's FCRA protection. Notwithstanding the knowledge that both
section 104 and the FCRA undermine their authority to enact tougher
privacy laws, states face the unenviable task of deciding whether to
enact regulations to carry out Title V itself. Under section 505(c), if
Id.
242. See GLBA § 506(c); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 266 (1999) (reiterating
that nothing in the title modifies, limits or supersedes the FCRA's operation). Amending the
FCRA, GLBA sections 506(a) and (b) extend the Federal banking agencies greater authority to
enforce and interpret the FCRA. See GLBA § 506(a) & (b).
243. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 266 (1999). Additionally, the Conference Report states
that "[t]he Conferees agreed to exclude disclosures to consumer reporting agencies from section
502(d)'s limitations on the sharing of account number information." Id.; see GLBA § 502(e)(6)
(exempting disclosures of nonpublic personal information "(A) to a consumer reporting agency in
accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or (B) from a consumer report reported by a
consumer reporting agency")
244. See BENSON, ET AL., supra note 12, at 111:
In a colloquy with Sen. Connie Mack, Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm
confirmed that Section 507 [Relation to State Laws] is intended to apply only to
Subtitle A of Title V and is not to be construed to apply to any provision of law
other than the provisions of the subtitle. Thus, Section 507 does not affect existing
Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act provisions on that statute's relationship to State
laws. Sen. Mack had submitted that Section 507 did not supersede, alter, or affect
the existing FCRA preemption of State laws with regard to the exchange of
information among affiliated entities.
Id. See generally William Anderson, State-Level Implications of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, ADVISOR
TODAY, Mar. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 15516374, stating:
none of the bill's privacy provisions can be interpreted to limit or supersede the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. Under the FCRA, special restrictions apply to sharing infor-
mation if the information will be used to make credit, insurance or employment
decisions. The 'inference' provision protects these requirements and ensures that
any FCRA obligations and restrictions that apply to the sharing of insurance infor-
mation are not undermined.
As aforementioned, under the GLBA, an "affiliate" is a company that controls, is controlled by, or
is under common control with another company. Thus, both Acts use the same basic definition of
"affiliate."
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state insurance authorities fail to enact regulations to carry out Title V,
then the states cannot override, pursuant to new FDIA section
47(g)(2)(B)(iii), the federal banking agencies' insurance customer pro-
tection regulations.245 Therefore, states may either (1) choose not to
adopt the Act's privacy provisions or (2) override the federal banking
agencies' consumer protection regulations. However, Part V of this arti-
cle considers whether in constructing this interplay between sections 305
and 505 Congress has in fact (1) coerced the states to enact privacy
regulations consistent with Title V or (2) provided them with a constitu-
tionally permissible choice.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SECTION 505(c)
As innocuous as Title V of the GLBA may appear by itself, the
relationship between Title III and Title V, specifically sections 305 and
505(c), raises an issue of constitutional significance. As written, the
GLBA does not unconstitutionally compel state insurance authorities to
enact the Title V regulations.2 46 In the Conference Report accompany-
ing the GLBA, Congress further elaborated on its intentions: "[iut is the
hope of the Conferees that state insurance authorities would implement
regulations to carry out the purposes of this title and enforce such regu-
lations as provided in this title. 2 47 As a result, Title V's language and
Congress' legislative intent support the states' freedom of choice.
When President Clinton signed the GLBA into law, he concurred
with Congress' intent.2 48 He interpreted section 505(c) of the Act "as
providing states with a constitutionally permissible choice of whether to
participate in such a program. States that choose to participate will gain
the powers listed in section 505(c); States that decline will not.
249
245. See GLBA § 505(c).
246. Section 504(a)(1) states that
The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Federal Trade Commission shall each prescribe, after consultation as appropriate
with representatives of State insurance authorities designated by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this subtitle with respect to the financial institutions
subject to their jurisdiction under section 505.
GLBA § 504. Thus, unlike the Federal agencies, Congress does not command the state insurance
authorities to enact regulations necessary to carry out Title V.
247. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 265 (1999). See generally Cain, et al., supra note 223,
at 26 ("The legislation allows states to adopt privacy regulations 'consistent and comparable' with
those adopted by other (Federal) regulators; it cannot require the States to do so.")
248. See Statement by the President, supra note 8, at 2365.
249. Id. Interestingly, in its final rule, NCUA complied with Executive Order 13132. See
NCUA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 31738 (May 8, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 716 & 741). The Executive Order encourages independent regulatory agencies to
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Thus, according to the President, by giving states a choice to "adopt
regulations to carry out this subtitle," Congress intended for the states
"to accept or decline the rulemaking and enforcement obligations
assigned to state authorities under sections 501-505 of the Act. '25° After
comparing the section 305 and 505(c) requirements to (1) the preemp-
tion doctrine in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson2 5' and
(2) the federalism principles found in New York v. United States,2 52
Printz v. United States253 and Reno v. Condon,254 one concludes that
Congress has not infringed upon states' rights and that the GLBA does
not unconstitutionally coerce states to enact a federal regulatory
program.255
A. The Statutory Structure: Sections 505(c) and 305
As discussed in Part III, section 305 amends the FDIA by adding
section 47. Under section 47(g), the federal banking agencies must pre-
scribe insurance customer protection regulations to prevent coerced tie-
ins of banking and insurance products by depository institutions that sell
insurance products.256 If the federal banking regulators determine
jointly that their insurance customer protection regulations offer greater
protection than comparable state laws, rules, regulations, orders or inter-
pretations, then the federal regulations will preempt the state regula-
tions.257 However, within three years after receiving notice from the
federal agencies, the states may enact legislation to override the federal
consider fundamental federalism principles when formulating and implementing regulations
affecting on state and local interests. See Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4,
1999); see also NCUA Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 31738 (2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 716
& 741) (May 18, 2000) (applying the Executive Order to NCUA's proposed privacy rule). The
NCUA stated that its rule
will not have substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between the
national government and the states, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. . . . The NCUA has
determined the proposed rule does not constitute a policy that has Federalism
implications for purposes of the executive order.
NCUA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra.
250. Statement by the President, supra note 8, at 2365.
251. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
252. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
253. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
254. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
255. The concept of "federalism" refers to the division of power between the Federal and State
governments. For a more thorough discussion of the concept, see Frank B. Cross, Realism About
Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304 (1999).
256. See supra Part III; see also Regulatory Advisory Services Practice of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Executive Overview and Summary of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Nov. 15, 1999, at II (on file with author) (discussing GLBA's requirement that the Federal
banking regulators enact insurance customer protection regulations).
257. See supra Part III.
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preemption. 58 Under section 505(c), if a state's insurance authorities
fail to adopt privacy regulations that carry out Title V, then that state
cannot override, pursuant to FDIA section 47(g)(2)(B)(iii), the federal
banking agencies' insurance customer protection regulations.259
B. Federalism and the Tenth Amendment
Federalism denotes "the coordinate relationship and distribution of
power between the individual States and the national government. 26 °
The framers of the Constitution sought to furnish the national govern-
ment with enough powers to protect the nation, reserving all other pow-
ers to the states. 26' Therefore, the framers enumerated the national
government's powers.2 62 As a result, federalism promotes efficiency,
individual choice, experimentation and participation in the democratic
process.263
The Tenth Amendment, reserving to the states all powers that the
Constitution does not delegate to the federal government, manifests the
states' role as independent entities of the federal government. "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people. '2 64 Thus, the Supreme Court will not invalidate a congressional
enactment without a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its con-
stitutional boundaries. 265 The United States is built upon this principle
of federalism, where the political system distributes governmental
authority between state and national governments.266
C. Basic Constitutional Principles for Congressional Financial
Services Legislation
In McCulloch v. Maryland2 67 and Osborn v. Bank of the United
258. See supra Part III.
259. See supra Part IV.
260. Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1485 (1990).
261. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION 184 (2d ed.
1999); GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148 (3d ed. 1996).
262. See STONE, ET AL., supra note 261, at 149.
263. See id. at 149-53.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. X.; see TRIBE, supra note 28, § 5-20, at 379; LIEBERMAN, supra note
261.
265. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000) ("Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution. 'The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or
forgotten, the constitution is written."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. Cranch 137, 176
(1803)))
266. See STONE, ET AL., supra note 261, at 149.
267. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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States,2 68 the Supreme Court sustained Congress' constitutional author-
ity to establish national banks.269 Using its broad general powers to bor-
row money, levy and collect taxes, pay public debts, raise and support
armies, declare and conduct war and regulate commerce, Congress may
constitutionally establish banks for national purposes.27 ° Thus, Congress
may make all necessary and proper laws that enable it to exercise such
powers.27' Indeed, Congress formed the national banking system to
facilitate the government's fiscal operations.272
The Supreme Court has rested the constitutionality of national
banking legislation on these principles.273 In furtherance of these princi-
ples, the Constitution not only empowers Congress to establish the
National Banking System, but also the Federal Reserve Bank System
and other institutions in furtherance of such power.2 74 Congress was
therefore within its constitutional power when, by enacting the FDIA, it
created the FDIC.275 Significantly, the Supreme Court has recognized
268. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
269. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418-420; Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 861.
270. See Smith v. Kansas City Tile & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 208 (1921) (discussing
McCulloch and Osborn). In McCulloch, the Court held that
[i]f a corporation may be employed, indiscriminately with other means, to carry into
execution the powers of the government, no particular reason can be assigned for
excluding the use of a bank, if required for its fiscal operations. To use one, must be
within the discretion of congress, if it be an appropriate mode for executing the
powers of government.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422.
271. See Smith, 255 U.S. at 208 (discussing McCulloch). Additionally, in Osborn, the Court
held that the bank "is an instrument which is 'necessary and proper' for carrying on the fiscal
operations of the government." Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 861 (discussing McCulloch).
272. See Smith, 255 U.S. at 209.
273. See id. (citing Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33-34
(1875)).
The national banks organized under the [National Bank] act are instruments
designed to be used to aid government in the administration of an important branch
of the public service. They are a means appropriate to that end. Of the degree of
the necessity which existed for creating them Congress is the sole judge .... Being
such means, brought into existence for this purpose, and intended to be so
employed, the States can exercise no control over them, nor in any wise affect their
operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit.... The power to
create carries with it the power to preserve. The latter is a corollary from the
former.
Id.
274. See Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 761
(1938) (citation omitted).
275. See id. at 636. The court went on to state:
And the power to inaugurate such systems and to create such institutions carries
with it inevitably the power to preserve and protect them. In pursuance of this
power of protection and preservation, Congress has created, as an agency of the
government, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to promote the soundness of
banking and aid the government in the discharge of its fiscal transactions. Its
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that federal regulations prescribed by administrative agencies have no
less preemptive effect than federal statutes. z76
D. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires courts to follow
federal rather than state law if Congress, in enacting a statute, intended
to exercise its constitutionally-permissible authority to set aside state
laws. 277  "So long as Congress acts within an area delegated to it, the
preemption of conflicting state or local action - and the validation of
congressionally authorized state or local action - flow directly from the
substantive source of power of the congressional action coupled with the
Supremacy Clause of article VI . ... 278 Thus, federal law may
expressly or impliedly supersede state law.2 79 Therefore, the Supreme
Court has recognized the Express and Implied Preemption doctrines,
and, within the doctrine of Implied Preemption, the Supreme Court has
recognized two applicable categories: (1) Field Preemption and (2) Con-
flict Preemption.28 °
1. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND SUPREMACY CLAUSE IN
BARNETr BANK
First, under Express Preemption Congress makes clear its intent to
obvious intent was, by insuring deposits, to prevent runs on banks by depositors, to
preserve solvency of insured banks, and thus to keep open the channels of trade and
commercial exchange. Clearly, under the decisions mentioned, the creation of the
corporation was within the constitutional power of the government ....
Id. at 636.
276. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982)
(citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961)) ("Where Congress has directed an
administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to
determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.").
277. The Supremacy Clause states that
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
30 (1996) ("The supreme court requires courts to follow federal, not state law.") Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) ("In determining whether a State statute is pre-
empted by federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, our
sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress.")
278. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 6-25, at 479.
279. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152-53.
280. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280-81; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152-54 (1982); see also John P.
C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption of State Banking Law, 18 ANN. Rev. BANKING L.
221, 227 (1999) (analyzing federal preemption doctrine).
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preempt state law by use of express language. 28' Second, under Field
Preemption, Congress' regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that one
may reasonably infer a congressional intent to preempt state law in the
particular field.282 Third, under Conflict Preemption, Congress has not
entirely displaced state regulation in certain areas but, to the extent that
federal law actually conflicts with state law, the federal law may pre-
empt state law. 83 In this situation, either (1) complying with both the
federal and state laws is a physical impossibility, or (2) the state law
stands as an obstacle to accomplishing and executing Congress' full pur-
poses and objectives.2 84
The Express Preemption doctrine is at issue in section 47 of the
FDIA. In section 47(g)(2)(b)(i), subject to the state override clause,
Congress expressly declares that the federal banking agencies' regula-
tions will preempt state law if the state law provides weaker protection
than the federal regulations. 285  Thus, if Congress can constitutionally
legislate in this particular field, then section 47, expressly stating Con-
gress' intent to preempt state law, will necessarily preempt state law. 86
Since the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutionality of Con-
gress' national banking legislations, as well as the authority of federal
agencies' to regulate according to such legislations, section 47 validly
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause. 87
Arguably, section 47 also activates Conflict Preemption principles.
Congress has explicitly delegated its implementing authority under sec-
281. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
285. See GLBA § 305 (adding Section 47 to the FDIA). Congress expressly states that:
If the Federal agencies referred to in clause (i) jointly determine that any provision
of the regulations prescribed under this section affords greater protections than a
comparable State law, rule, regulation, order, or interpretation, those agencies shall
send a written preemption notice to the appropriate State regulatory authority to
notify the State that the Federal provision will preempt the State provision and will
become applicable unless, not later than 3 years after the date of such notice, the
State adopts legislation to override such preemption.
Id. See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (discussing the express
preemption doctrine); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (same). See generally
Duncan, supra note 280, at 303-05 (1999) (discussing Federal agencies' preemption authority).
286. See Duncan, supra note 280, at 229 (1999) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977)).
287. See Smith v. Kan. City Tile & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 208-11 (1921) (discussing
McCulloch and other Supreme Court cases recognizing Congress' constitutional authority to
prescribe national banking legislation); Weir, 92 F.2d at 636 (same); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S.
at 496 (discussing how preemption does not arise directly from the statute's enactment, but rather
from the regulations prescribed by a Federal agency "to which Congress has delegated its
authority to implement the provisions of the Act"). See generally Duncan, supra note 280, at 305-
07 (1999) (discussing preemption under the Medtronic holding).
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tion 47 to the federal banking agencies.288 Thus, preemption under sec-
tion 47 does not arise directly from the enactment of the GLBA.289
Rather, if the federal banking agencies promulgate stronger federal regu-
lations, only then will the federal regulations preempt weaker state
laws.29° Since Congress has delegated its authority to implement the
provisions of section 47 to the federal banking agencies, the federal
banking agencies are "uniquely qualified" to determine whether a state
law (1) makes complying with both the federal and state laws a physical
impossibility or (2) stands as an obstacle to accomplishing and execut-
ing Congress' full purposes and objectives under section 47.291
Regardless, where Congress has directed a federal agency to exer-
cise its discretion, the federal agency's subsequent regulations have no
less preemptive effect than a federal statute.292 Thus, as long as the
federal banking agencies do not exceed their statutory authority or act
arbitrarily, their insurance customer protection regulations under section
47 will preempt weaker state laws. Therefore, even though Congress
added an override clause to section 47, allowing states to enact legisla-
tion to override the federal preemption, this action was purely discre-
tionary. With or without the override clause, Congress may
constitutionally preempt state laws under section 47 of the FDIA.293
2. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
The McCarran-Ferguson Act 294 creates an interesting wrinkle in the
preemption analysis. The Supreme Court has recognized that insurance
companies conducting a substantial part of their business across state
lines are engaging in interstate commerce; thus, such entities are subject
to federal laws under Congress' interstate commerce power.295 Con-
288. See GLBA § 305 (adding Section 47 to the FDIA); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496
(discussing Congress' express delegation of its implementing authorities under the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k), to the FDA).
289. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496.
290. See id.
291. See id. ("[T]he agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of
State law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress,' ... and, therefore, whether it should be preempted.") (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
292. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153; see also Executive Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg.
43255 (1999) (setting forth fundamental federalism principles that agencies must use when
formulating and implementing policies with federalism implications).
293. One should note that the above reasoning applies equally to preemption challenges under
either GLBA section 104 or section 305. Congress has the constitutional authority to prescribe
federal banking legislation. Thus, subject to McCarran-Ferguson Act requirements, Congress may
expressly preempt state laws that prevent or restrict depository institutions and their affiliates from
exercising their rights under federal law to affiliate and associate with others.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1994).
295. See Humana Inc., v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 306 (1999); Barnett Bank of Marion County,
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gress responded to this recognition with the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 2 9 6
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, unless federal law "specifically
relates to the business of insurance," federal law will not preempt state
law enacted to regulate the insurance business.297 To determine whether
a federal law "specifically relates to the business of insurance," one must
consider whether the federal law (1) focuses directly on industry-spe-
cific selling practices and (2) affects risk spreading as well as the rela-
tionship between insured and insurer.298
FDIA section 47 satisfies both criteria. First, section 47 directs the
federal banking agencies to prescribe insurance customer protection reg-
ulations that
(A) apply to retail sales practices, solicitations, advertising, or
offers of any insurance product by any depository institution or any
person that is engaged in such activities at an office of the institution
or on behalf of the institution; and (B) are consistent with the require-
ments of this Act and provide such additional protections for custom-
ers to whom such sales, solicitations, advertising, or offers are
directed.299
Second, to facilitate its Congressional directive, section 47 requires
that the federal banking agencies' regulations include (1) anti-tying and
anti-coercion, uninsured status and investment risk disclosures; (2) pro-
visions separating banking and insurance product activity; and (3)
domestic violence discrimination prohibitions.3"
Therefore, GLBA section 305, adding section 47 to the FDIA, spe-
517 U.S. at 40-41 (1996); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn, 322 U.S. 533, 542-
53 (1944); see also Cynthia T. Andreason, Federal Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson Act:
The Never Ending Story - Part 1, 5 No. I MEINSD 25 (2000) (discussing the case and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act).
296. See Andreason, supra note 295.
297. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see also Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 40-41 (discussing preemption of
state law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
298. The Supreme Court in Barnett Bank applied the state law "business of insurance" test to
the Federal law at issue in the case. See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 39 (citing Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221-24 (1979))); see also UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 119 S.Ct.
1380, 1386 (1999) (holding that, when determining whether state law regulates the "business of
insurance," the Court considers whether (1) common sense dictates that the contested provision
regulates insurance and (2) (a) the practice effectively transfers or spreads policyholders' risk; (b)
the practice is an integral part of the insurer/insured policy relationship; and (c) the practice is
limited to insurance industry entities); SEC v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)
(discussing the elements that comprise the "business of insurance"); Fabe, 508 U.S. at 502-04
(same).
299. GLBA § 305 (adding FDIA section 47(a)).
300. See supra Part III; see also Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 39 (stating that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act "seeks to protect state regulation primarily against inadvertent federal intrusion -
say, through enactment of a federal statute that describes an affected activity in broad, general
terms, of which the insurance business happens to constitute one part."); Ward, 119 S.Ct. at 1386
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cifically relates to the business of insurance. The scope of the federal
banking agencies' insurance customer protection regulations not only
focus directly on industry-specific selling practices, but also affect risk-
spreading as well as the relationship between insured and insurer.30 As
such, the McCarran-Ferguson Act's anti-preemption rule does not apply
to section 47.
E. Is Section 505(c) Unconstitutional Under Supreme
Court Precedent?
Although GLBA section 305/FDIA section 47 represents a consti-
tutional exercise of Congressional authority, section 305 does not exist
in a vacuum. If, by conditioning the states' access to the section 47
override clause on the states' adopting regulations to carry out Title V,
Congress has compelled the states to enact a federal regulatory program
governing financial privacy, then section 505(c) unconstitutionally
infringes upon states' rights. To resolve this issue, one must measure
the relationship between sections 305 and 505(c) against Supreme Court
precedent.
1. STRIKE ONE: NEw YORK V. UNITED STATES
In New York v. United States,3 °2 the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress, through federal legislation, could neither compel states to adopt
state legislation regulating the disposal of low level radioactive waste,
nor compel states to assume ownership of such privately owned waste
within their borders.30 3 Provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act Amendments of 1985304 (1) declared that states were prima-
rily responsible for disposing of waste within their borders, and (2)
authorized states to enter into regional compacts restricting their dispo-
sal facilities' use to states that were members of the compact. 3 5 Thus,
Congress provided the states with three mechanisms to comply with
("First, we ask whether, from a 'common-sense view of the matter,' the contested prescription
regulates insurance.") (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass. 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985)).
301. Section 47 does not need to satisfy all three factors in order to fall within the "business of
insurance." See Ward, 119 S.Ct. at 1389. The factors are merely considerations to weigh when
making the determination; none of the factors is necessarily determinative in and of itself. See id.
(citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49 (1987); Metro. Life Ins., 471 U.S. at 743;
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); O'Connor v. UNUM Life Ins. Co.
of Am. 146 F.3d 959, 963 (C.A.D.C. 1998)).
302. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
303. See id. at 188.
304. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)-2021(e) (1994).
305. See §§ 2021(c)(2)(1)(A), (d)(2)(2); see also, New York, 505 U.S. at 150-52 (discussing
relevant statutory provisions).
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their statutory waste disposal obligation.3 °6 Two of these mechanisms
were affirmed by the Supreme Court, but the Court held that the third
mechanism exceeded Congress' constitutional authority.
30 7
According to the Court, Congress may encourage states to regulate
in a certain way, as well as hold out incentives to the state in order to
influence its policymaking, as long as such encouragement stops short of
outright coercion. 30 ' The Court set forth two guidelines. First, under
the Commerce and Spending Clauses, Congress may condition states'
receipt of federal funds on the states' meeting federal goals. 30 9 How-
ever, such conditions must bear some relation to the purpose of the fed-
eral funds.31 ° Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate
private activity under its commerce power, Congress may "offer states
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. "311 Under either of
these two guidelines, the states retain ultimate decision-making power
over whether or not to comply with the federal policy choices.312
With these guidelines in mind, the Court considered the three chal-
lenged mechanisms of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
Amendments. Under the first mechanism, Congress authorized states
with disposal sites to impose a surcharge for receiving other states'
waste.31 3 The Secretary of Energy would then collect a part of the
surcharge and deposit it into an escrow account.3 4 Finally, states that
achieved a series of milestones would receive a portion of this fund.
31 5
As such, the Court declared that under the first mechanism Congress had
306. See New York, 505 U.S. at 152.
307. See id. at 171-77.
308. See id. at 166-67.
309. See id. at 167.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 167-68. Many Federal statutes include this type of preemption. See e.g. Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 12 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994); Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act; 16 U.S.C. §3101) (1994).
312. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168. As the court noted:
If a State's citizens view Federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests,
they may elect to decline a Federal grant. If State residents would prefer their
government to devote its attention and resources to problems other than those
deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government
rather than the State bear the expense of a Federally mandated regulatory program,
and they may continue to supplement that program to the extent State law is not
preempted. Where Congress encourages State regulation rather than compelling it,
State governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; State
officials remain accountable to the people.
Id.
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constitutionally exercised its Commerce and Spending powers. 3, 6
Under the second mechanism, Congress authorized states and
regional compacts with disposal sites to impose a discriminatory tax,
and eventually a total bar, against importing radioactive waste from
states that did not meet federal deadlines.3" 7 This mechanism fell within
Congress' power to allow states to discriminate against interstate com-
merce."' Thus, under the Commerce Clause, if Congress can regulate
the private activity in question, then Congress may offer states a choice
of either (1) regulating the activity according to federal standards or (2)
having federal regulation allowing authorized states to deny entry to
their disposal sites preempt state law. 319 Therefore, the second mecha-
nism represented a conditional exercise of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause.32°
Under the third mechanism, the "take title provision," the Court
held that Congress unconstitutionally infringed upon state sover-
eignty. 32' The "take title provision" allowed states to (1) adopt laws
regulating storage and disposal of radioactive waste according to Con-
gress' instructions or (2) accept ownership, possession and potential lia-
bility for their waste.3 2 Reaffirming principles from Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., Inc.323 and Fed. Energy Regu-
latory Comm'n v. Mississippi.324  The Court held that Congress may
316. See id. at 172-73.
317. See id. at 173.
318. See id. at 173-74.
319. See id. at 174 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981); Fed. Energy Regulating Comm'n. v. Mississippi. 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982)).
The court went on to state:
States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to federal
standards . . . or their residents who produce radioactive waste will be subject to
Federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their
disposal sites. The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate,
because any burden caused by a State's refusal to regulate will fall on those who
generate waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as
sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act's milestones may
devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more worthy; the
choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with Congress. The
State need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, if local
residents do not view such expenditures or participation as worthwhile. . . . Nor
must the State abandon the field if it does not accede to federal direction; the State
may continue to regulate the generation and disposal of radioactive waste in any
manner its citizens see fit.
Id.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 174-75.
322. See id.
323. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
324. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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neither commandeer state governments into service for federal regula-
tory purposes, nor command states to implement federal legislation.325
Thus, either instructing states to take title to waste or issuing a direct
order to regulate according to Congress' instructions would exceed Con-
gress' authority. Therefore, providing states with a choice between the
two is equally unconstitutional.326
Unlike the first two mechanisms, the "take title provision" did not
represent a conditional exercise of Congress' enumerated powers.
Rather than threatening to exercise its spending or commerce power,
Congress merely threatened the states with one federal instruction for
failing to regulate according to another federal instruction. 327 Therefore,
Congress commandeered the states' legislative processes by directly
coercing them to enact a federal regulatory program.328
Thus, the states could not decline to administer the federal pro-
gram; regardless of the alternative chosen, the states had to follow Con-
gress' instructions.3 29 But, rather than either (1) authorizing Congress to
require states to regulate or (2) allowing Congress to commandeer state
governments as its agents, the Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate matters directly and preempt contrary state laws. "While Con-
gress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in
areas of intimate concern to the states, the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the states to
govern according to Congress' instructions. '330  Therefore, under the
325. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
326. See id. at 176.
327. See id. ("A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no
choice at all.")
328. See id. (quoting Hodel v. Va. 452 U.S. at 288.
329. See id. at 176-77.
330. Id. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)); see id. at 178 (discussing the
permissible scope of Congress' legislative authority under the Constitution). The court also noted
that:
[Wihere the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of
both state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for
example, do not consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste
is in their best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That
view can always be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the
national view, but in such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the
decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the
consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where
the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be State officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected
state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in
matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id. at 168-69 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federal-
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Constitution, Congress may (1) preempt state laws contrary to federal
interests and (2) use incentives to encourage states to adopt a federal
regulatory scheme. Congress may not however direct states to enact and
administer federal regulatory programs.331
2. STRIKE Two: PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES
In Printz v. United States,33 2 the Supreme Court held that certain
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 333 comman-
deering state law enforcement officers to perform background checks
and other related tasks, violated the Constitution. 334 The Act required
regulated arms dealers to forward forms to state law enforcement
officers regarding proposed firearm transfers and within five days of
receiving the form, the officers, using reasonable efforts, had to deter-
mine the legality of the proposed sale.335 Therefore, the Brady Act tem-
porarily directed state law enforcement officers to participate in
administering a federally enacted regulatory program.336
Since Congress cannot compel states to enact legislation imple-
menting federal regulatory programs, Congress may not circumvent this
general prohibition by enlisting the states' officers directly. 337 Regard-
less of whether the federal program involves state policymaking, "the
federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the states to
address particular problems, nor command the states' officers, or those
of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regula-
tory program. ' 338 This places the states in the unenviable position of
having to either (1) absorb the financial burden of implementing the fed-
eral program or (2) take the blame for the Act and its defects. Moreover,
ism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. I, 61-62 (1988); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political Process - The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federal-
ism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577, 639-65 (1985)).
331. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
332. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
333. 18 U.S.C. § 992 (1993).
334. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (1997). Such Congressional action is incompatible with the
United States' system of federalism. See id. Thus, residual State sovereignty is implicit in Article
I of the Constitution, conferring enumerated powers to Congress, see U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, see
also Printz, 521 U.S. at 819, as well as in the language of the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U. S. CoNsT. amend. X. For a thorough discussion of
Printz, see Lang Gin, Printz v. United States: The Revival of Constitutional Federalism, 26 PEPP.
L. Rav. 631 (1999) (analyzing the case); Eric N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Court and the States:
Do Lopez and Printz Represent a Broader Pro-State Movement?, 14 J.L. & POL. 319 (1998)
(same).
335. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03.
336. See id. at 904.
337. See id. at 935.
338. Id.
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such federal laws do not preserve the states' independent and autono-
mous political character.339 Thus, the whole object of the Brady Act
was to direct the functioning of state executives; therefore, the Act com-
promised the framework of dual sovereignty.34 °
3. STRIKE THREE: RENO V. CONDON
Reno v. Condon3 4 ' represents the Supreme Court's most recent elu-
cidation on the subject of federalism. In Condon, the Supreme Court
held that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994342 (hereinafter
"DDPA") represented a proper exercise of Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce and that the Act did not violate the Tenth Amend-
ment.343 The DDPA regulates the states' disclosure and resale of per-
sonal information contained in state motor vehicle department records.
Therefore, subject to certain exceptions, the states cannot disclose such
information without the driver's consent. 344 Indeed, a driver's failure to
elect nondisclosure does not permit a state to infer consent rather, the
state must obtain the driver's affirmative consent before disclosing his or
her personal information.345 Significantly, the DDPA is a generally
applicable law; it applies not only to the states, but also to private per-
sons who disclose and resell drivers' personal information. 46
The Supreme Court held that Congress may use its Commerce
Clause power to regulate, under the DDPA, the sale or release of per-
sonal, identifying information in interstate commerce.347 However,
Congress must regulate this information without violating the federalism
principles contained within the Tenth Amendment.34 In accordance
with South Carolina v. Baker,3 49 the Court found that the DDPA does
not require the states to regulate their citizens; rather, the DDPA regu-
339. See id. at 928-930.
340. See id. at 928.
341. 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000).
342. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994).
343. See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at, 671-73 (2000).
344. See id. at 668.
345. See id. at 669.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 671. The court noted:
The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by
insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate
commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also
used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for
matters related to interstate motoring. Because drivers' information is, in this
context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of
business is sufficient to support congressional regulation.
Id.
348. See id.
349. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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lates the states as owners of the databases.3 ° In Baker, the Court held
that the federal statute at issue "regulates state activities; it does not...
seek to control or influence the manner in which states regulate private
parties." '' Thus, the DDPA requires neither state legislatures to enact
laws or regulations, nor state officials to assist in enforcing federal stat-
utes regulating private individuals." 2 As such, the DDPA is consistent
with the Court's principles in New York and Printz.
3 3
4. COMPARING THE FACTS OF THE GLBA WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW PRINCIPLES
Rather than regulating state activities, Congress, through GLBA
section 505(c), is seeking to influence the way that states regulate the
insurance industry.354  Thus, section 505(c) is distinguishable from the
statute at issue in Condon, where Congress regulated state activities by
restricting the release of personal information from state motor vehicle
records.355 In Condon, even though state legislatures will need to amend
their statutes to comply with the DDPA, such "commandeering" of the
state legislative and administrative processes is an inevitable conse-
quence when Congress, properly exercising its constitutional authority,
regulates a state activity . 6  However, under GLBA section 505(c), if
state insurance authorities fail to enact regulations to carry out Title V,
then they will lose the ability to override the federal banking agencies'
insurance customer protection regulations. Thus, section 505(c)
"attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. 357
350. See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 672. Interestingly, the Court in New York does not apply Baker
because "this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation
applicable to private parties .... This litigation instead concerns the circumstances under which
Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a
particular way." New York, 505 U.S. at 160-61 (1992).
351. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 514 (1988). Significantly, the Court recognized that
a federal statute may "commandeer" state legislative and administrative processes because State
legislatures will need to amend existing statutes to comply with the federal law. See id. However,
such "commandeering" is "an inevitable consequence of regulating a State activity. Any Federal
regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take
administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with Federal standards regulating the
activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect." Id. at 514-15.
352. See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 672.
353. See id. For a thorough analysis of Tenth Amendment-Commerce Clause cases up to the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), see Stephen G.
Hartzell-Jordan, Note: Condon v. Reno and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act: Was Garcia a
Bump in the Road To States' Rights?, 78 N.C.L. REV. 217 (1999).
354. But see Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (upholding a statute that regulated state activities).
355. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721; Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 672.
356. See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 672.
357. Fed. Energ. Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 759.
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Therefore, the Court's holdings in New York and Printz govern the con-
stitutionality of section 505(c).
According to the New York Court, even if Congress has the consti-
tutional authority to pass laws requiring specific acts, it cannot directly
compel the states to require such acts.3 58 For example, under its Com-
merce Clause power, Congress may directly regulate interstate com-
merce; however, Congress cannot regulate the state government's
regulation of interstate commerce.359 Yet, Congress may encourage
states to regulate in a manner consistent with federal interests, as well as
hold out incentives to influence state's policy choices.36° In a round-
about way, this is the choice that Congress offers the states in section
505(c).
In New York, the Court stated that if federal regulation of a particu-
lar activity falls within Congress' Commerce Clause authority, then
Congress may offer the states a choice between regulating that activity
according to the federal standards or having federal regulation preempt
state law. 36 ' Thus, according to New York, under the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses, Congress may preempt state law governing a spe-
cific activity, or the states may choose to regulate that specific activity
according to federal standards. 362  Alternatively, under GLBA section
505(c), Congress offers the states a choice between regulating privacy of
customers' financial information according to Title V standards, or hav-
ing the federal banking agencies' insurance customer protection regula-
tions preempt weaker state laws in that field.
Section 505(c) requires states to decide either to regulate one activ-
358. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 456 U.S. at 762-
66; Hode, 452 U.S. at 288-89).
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 167, 173-74 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288). In Rachel F. Preiser, Staking Out
the Border Between Commandeering and Conditional Preemption: Is the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act Constitutional Under the Tenth Amendment?, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 514 (1999), the
author noted that:
Some courts have read too narrowly New York's exemption from its anti-
commandeering imperative and, as a result, have understood that exemption as
applying exclusively to laws that preempt State regulation of private parties. This
error derives from a misreading of the New York Court's Statement that 'where
Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause,
we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that
activity according to Federal standards or having State law preempted by Federal
regulation.' Although this pronouncement is concerned with laws that regulate
private parties, it does not suggest, as some courts have inferred, that Federal
preemption of State law is only permissible with regard to regulation of private
activity.
Id. at 535.
362. See New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74.
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ity (privacy) according to one federal standard, or have state law regulat-
ing a different activity (insurance customer protections) preempted by a
different federal regulation altogether. Even so, the New York Court's
reasoning applies to this scenario as well; section 505(c) merely extends
the Court's holding in New York to its next logical step. Thus, through
the section 505(c) mechanism, Congress uses its constitutional preemp-
tion power to encourage the states to adopt regulations consistent with
federal interests. That Congress is using its preemption power over one
area of state law to influence the state's policy choices in another area
entirely is irrelevant; the section 505(c) mechanism does not defeat state
sovereignty preserved by the Tenth Amendment.
As aforementioned, enacting the FDIA, as well as prescribing legis-
lation that specifically relates to the business of insurance, like FDIA
section 47, falls well within Congress' constitutional powers to borrow
money, levy and collect taxes, pay public debts, raise and support
armies, declare and conduct war and regulate commerce.363 Thus, when
acting within its constitutional limits, Congress may preempt state
law. 3 64 As such, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress has the
power to preempt state insurance law completely, if the federal law spe-
cifically relates to the business of insurance.365
Therefore, in enacting FDIA section 47, Congress could have pre-
empted all state insurance customer protection regulations.366 However,
"out of deference to state authority, Congress ... adopted a less intru-
sive scheme and allowed the states to continue regulating in the area" of
insurance customer protections.367 Section 505(c) does not impair the
states' continued ability to function in the federal system. Instead, it
provides the states with a mechanism for preserving their historic regula-
tory role in the field of insurance regulation, despite the fact that this
field of law is subject to potential federal preemption.3 68
363. See supra note i70 and accompanying text.
364. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
365. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994). See generally Fed. Energy Regulatory Comn'n., 456 U.S. 742
(1982) (discussing Congress' general preemption authority).
366. See id. at 765 (discussing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264). In Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n.
the statute at issue was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 Pub. L. 95-617, 92
STAT. 3117 (hereinafter "PURPA"). Titles III and V of PURPA conditioned continued state
involvement in a field subject to potential preemption upon the states' consideration of federal
proposals. See id. at 766. Thus, although PUPRA required the states only to consider suggested
federal standards, GLBA requires states to actually enact regulations carrying out Title V, or else
lose their ability to enter such a field. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n., however, did not
condition constitutionality on the fact that states consider, rather than actually enact, suggested
federal standards. See id. at 765, 771. Thus, the constitutional analysis in Part V merely carries
the Court's holding in Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n. to its next logical step.
367. Id. at 765.
368. See id. at 766.
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As such, section 505(c) does not present the states with two uncon-
stitutionally coercive regulatory techniques "simply because Congress
chose to allow the states a regulatory role" in FDIA section 47.369
Granted, Congress cannot command state governments to enact regula-
tions carrying out Title V.370 However, if states fail to adopt regulations
to carry out Title V, Congress may threaten to exercise its Supremacy
Clause power to preempt state insurance customer protection regula-
tions: "the Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate
matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation."37' Thus,
Congress has constitutional authority to offer the states a choice between
them.372
Section 505(c) constitutionally allows the states to either regulate
the insurance industry's disclosure of nonpublic personal information
according to the federal standards in Title V, or to refuse such standards
and lose the right to override federal regulations governing a depository
institution's insurance customer protections. In prescribing this mecha-
nism, Congress is neither compelling the states to adopt regulations car-
rying out Title V, nor circumventing that prohibition by commanding
the state insurance authorities to adopt such regulations. At all times,
the choice to adopt regulations carrying out Title V remains not with
Congress, but rather with the states.
Understandably, states face a difficult choice of either (1) refusing
to adopt regulations to carry out Title V and abandoning the freedom to
override the federal banking agencies' insurance customer protections or
(2) adopting such regulations.373 However, valid federal enactments,
like FDIA section 47, can affect state policy or motivate state action in
areas otherwise beyond Congress' regulatory authority without violating
Tenth Amendment principles.374
5. PRIVACY AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
As the Supreme Court held in New York, although Congress has
power to govern in areas of intimate state concern, Congress cannot,
under the Constitution, require states to govern according to its instruc-
tions.375 As an example of Congress' power to regulate such areas, in
369. Id. at 764 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290).
370. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
371. Id. at 178.
372. See id. at 176; see also Preiser, supra note 361, at 520 ("The New York and Printz Courts
acknowledge that Federal laws that preempt State regulation, or conditionally preempt it by
allowing States to choose between preemption and implementation of Federal regulations, also
escape the problems posed by commandeering.")
373. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982).
374. See id.
375. See New York, 505 U.S. at 162, 177-80.
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Condon, the Court upheld the DDPA as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' authority under the Commerce Clause.3 76 Specifically, the Court
held that personal, identifying information is a "thin[g] in interstate
commerce," thus agreeing that Congress, via the DDPA, could regulate
the sale or release of personal, identifying information in interstate com-
merce. 377 To support its holding, the Court further stated that (1) insur-
ers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaging in interstate
commerce use motor vehicle information to solicit drivers, and (2) vari-
ous public and private entities use this information in interstate com-
merce for matters connected to interstate motoring.378 Thus, since the
driver's information is an article of commerce, selling or releasing the
information into the "interstate stream of business" sufficiently supports
Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.379
Even though Congress, in Title V, did not choose to regulate the
insurance industry's disclosure of nonpublic personal information
directly, the Condon holding supports the proposition that such direct
regulation falls within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
Under the Court's reasoning in Condon, nonpublic personal information
of a financial institution's customers is also a part of interstate com-
merce. Financial institutions sell customers' private information to mar-
keting companies which in turn use the information in the stream of
interstate commerce.38° Thus, Congress could regulate the sale or
release of an insurance customer's nonpublic personal information in
interstate commerce. Such federal legislation, specifically related to the
business of insurance, is consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
preemption standard.38' However, apparently out of respect for the his-
toric role of the state as regulator of the insurance industry, Congress
chose not to pursue this constitutionally available option.
376. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666, 671 (2000). For a detailed review of the Commerce
Clause's history, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-57 (1995). For the most recent
Supreme Court Commerce Clause analysis of Congressional legislation, see United States v.
Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000) (holding unconstitutional 42 U.S.C. § 13981, the Federal civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994).
377. See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 671 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59). The DDPA defines
"personal information" as "information that identifies an individual, including an individual's
photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the five-
digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not include
information on vehicular accidents, violations, and driver's status." 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (1994).
378. See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 671.
379. Id.
380. See Dugas, Banks Sell Your Secrets supra note 2.
381. See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
The GLBA will not do much to pacify those consumers who were
shocked to discover that banks do in fact "sell their secrets. ' 382 At first
glance, however, Title V makes some major strides in the area of finan-
cial privacy. Financial institutions now have an affirmative and continu-
ing obligation to respect their customers' privacy. Once merely
optional, Title V now requires financial institutions to develop privacy
policies.384 In addition, financial institutions must disclose their policies
to consumers, giving them an opportunity to opt out of information shar-
ing with nonaffiliated third parties.385 Significantly, states may enact
privacy laws that are tougher than the federal standard without fear of
preemption.386 Thus, Title V is packaged to sell.
However, no matter how fancy the packaging, a defective product
is still a defective product. Upon closer examination, Title V is riddled
with loopholes and exceptions that severely weaken, if not paralyze, the
consumers' power to opt out of information sharing between financial
institutions and nonaffiliated third parties. In fact, the GLBA does not
restrict financial institutions' freedom to share such information with
their affiliates. Significantly, although section 507 gives states the
power to enact tougher privacy laws, section 104 and the FCRA signifi-
cantly restrict that power. Therefore, as far as consumers are concerned,
the net result of the GLBA is glorified notice.387
When President Clinton signed the GLBA into law, he pressed for
even greater privacy protections in the future. In doing so, he raised an
important question concerning the constitutionality of the GLBA's cur-
rent privacy provisions.388 Thus, seizing upon the President's question,
this writer confirms the President's tentative answer. Congress may
constitutionally condition the states' freedom to override insurance cus-
tomer protection regulations on their decision to adopt Title V privacy
regulations. Rather than using coercive tactics, Congress, through the
section 505(c) mechanism, has provided the states with a constitution-
ally permissible incentive to adopt the Title V privacy provisions.389
Although the GLBA financial privacy mechanism is constitutional, such
382. See Dugas, Banks Sell Your Secrets supra note 2; see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5 ("This is
a burgeoning policy issue, and to think that it isn't is to be catastrophically nayve.")




387. See generally Krebs, supra note 205 (analyzing the pros and cons of GLBA's privacy
provisions).
388. See Statement by the President, supra note 8.
389. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 (1997) (reiterating the Court's holding in
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n. that "the statutory provisions at issue ... did not commandeer
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an academic declaration does not remedy the inherent flaws embedded
in the GLBA's regulatory structure. Hopefully, this time it will not take
Congress sixty-six years to overhaul a malfunctioning system.
state government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise
pre-empted field...").
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